Phone number is a unique identity code of a mobile subscriber, which plays a more important role in the mobile social network life than another identification number IMSI. Unlike the IMSI, a mobile device never transmits its own phone number to the network side in the radio. However, the mobile network may send a user’s phone number to another mobile terminal when this user initiating a call or SMS service. Based on the above facts, with the help of an IMSI catcher and 2G man-in-the-middle attack, this paper implemented a practicable and effective phone number catcher prototype targeting at LTE mobile phones. We caught the LTE user’s phone number within a few seconds after the device camped on our rogue station. This paper intends to verify that mobile privacy is also quite vulnerable even in LTE networks as long as the legacy GSM still exists. Moreover, we demonstrated that anyone with basic programming skills and the knowledge of GSM/LTE specifications can easily build a phone number catcher using SDR tools and commercial off-the-shelf devices. Hence, we hope the operators worldwide can completely disable the GSM mobile networks in the areas covered by 3G and 4G networks as soon as possible to reduce the possibility of attacks on higher-generation cellular networks. Several potential countermeasures are also discussed to temporarily or permanently defend the attack.

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Researchers commonly use industry classifications as a means of identifying peer companies to use as a performance benchmark. We describe the structure of commonly used sources of industry classification data available for Australian listed companies, both static and in time series. Next, we run a series of experiments matching firms according to GICS classification data presented in time series versus static data sources. Our results indicate that performance measures are better specified when matching on GICS data from a dynamic relative to a static source. The results of our power tests also underscore the importance of using dynamic industry data.

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This paper investigates the potential for accounting rules to mitigate under-investment induced by myopic managerial incentives. It exploits the difference within US GAAP requiring the capitalization of some research and development (R&D) costs in software development but proscribing the capitalization of R&D in other industries. We first investigate whether other hi-technology firms with no capitalization of R&D costs suffer higher levels of under-investment in myopic settings relative to software development firms. Second, we investigate whether the capitalization rule assists in mitigating under-investment within the software development industry, and whether this comes at the cost of over-investment in the presence of financial flexibility. Our findings are consistent with the mitigation of under-investment in the software development setting but we find no evidence of over-investment in the presence of high financial flexibility. Other hi-tech firms that cannot capitalize R&D costs suffer higher levels of under-investment relative to software development firms. Finally, we find that the ability to capitalize for the sample of software firms does reduce the probability of cutting R&D investment when managers are under earnings pressure. The findings in this paper are relevant to standard setters seeking to understand the costs imposed by (understandably) conservative accounting rules, and how verification of points of feasibility alongside less conservative accounting can prevent dysfunctional investment outcomes. This is the first study to consider whether the ability to (justifiably) capitalize the costs of internally generated intangibles can improve investment efficiency (the allocation of resources).