Three experiments investigated 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' (N = 240) understanding that their future or "grown-up" preferences may differ from their current ones (self-future condition). This understanding was compared to children's understanding of the preferences of a grown-up (adult-now condition) or the grown-up preferences of a same-aged peer (peer-future condition). Children's performance across all three conditions improved significantly with age. Moreover, children found it significantly more difficult to reason about their own future preferences than they did to reason either about an adult's preferences or the future preferences of a peer. These results have important implications for theories about future thinking and perspective-taking abilities, more broadly.

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Planning and self-control were examined in relation to preschoolers' (41- to 74-months) saving behavior. Employing a marble run paradigm, 54 children participated in two trials in which they could use their marbles immediately on a less desirable run, or save for a more desirable run. Twenty-nine children received the opportunity to create a budget. On Trial 1, children in the budgeting condition saved significantly more than did children in the control condition, and their planning ability related to saving (after controlling for age and language). Those who consistently budgeted at least one marble for the more desirable run were more likely to save. Control children's performance improved across trials, with no between-condition differences on Trial 2. Self-control was not related to saving.

The Day/Night Stroop is a widely used measure of inhibitory control with preschoolers that requires them to respond ‘day’ to a picture of a moon and ‘night’ to a picture of a sun (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994). However, we argue that the nature of the relation between the stimuli and required responses requires more than inhibitory control. In the present study we compared 51 three‐ to five‐year‐olds' performance on the Day/Night and the Black/White Stroop alongside other measures of Executive Function and language. As predicted, we found that children make inhibitory errors on the Black/White, while they make both inhibitory and memory errors on the Day/Night. As a result, the Day/Night Stroop underestimates the inhibitory control abilities of some children. Further, we also found that performance on the Black/White task was strongly related to performance on another inhibitory control task, while performance on the Day/Night was not. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

We told ninety-nine 4- and 5-year-olds stories in which speakers told lies and truths in two contexts: those told to deny a transgression (misdeeds) and those told to spare another’s feelings (politeness). Participants identified each statement as a lie or as the truth, morally judged it as good or bad, and decided whether or not to assign punishment to the speaker. All children received measures of first- and second-order false-belief understanding. Although 4-year-olds were above chance in their identification accuracy, they did not differentiate between lies and truths in their moral judgments or punishments. Five-year-olds outperformed 4-year-olds in their identification accuracy, morally judged lies more negatively than truths, and assigned speakers of lies more punishment than those who told truths. Five-year-olds also treated lies about misdeeds more negatively than politeness lies in their moral judgments and punishments. Children’s identification of both lies and truths related to their first-order false-belief understanding, while their moral judgments and punishment of lies related to their second-order false-belief understanding. These findings suggest that different considerations are made when children reason about the conceptual and moral differences between lies and truths.