We told ninety-nine 4- and 5-year-olds stories in which speakers told lies and truths in two contexts: those told to deny a transgression (misdeeds) and those told to spare another’s feelings (politeness). Participants identified each statement as a lie or as the truth, morally judged it as good or bad, and decided whether or not to assign punishment to the speaker. All children received measures of first- and second-order false-belief understanding. Although 4-year-olds were above chance in their identification accuracy, they did not differentiate between lies and truths in their moral judgments or punishments. Five-year-olds outperformed 4-year-olds in their identification accuracy, morally judged lies more negatively than truths, and assigned speakers of lies more punishment than those who told truths. Five-year-olds also treated lies about misdeeds more negatively than politeness lies in their moral judgments and punishments. Children’s identification of both lies and truths related to their first-order false-belief understanding, while their moral judgments and punishment of lies related to their second-order false-belief understanding. These findings suggest that different considerations are made when children reason about the conceptual and moral differences between lies and truths.

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Most primates are intensely social and spend a large amount of time servicing social relationships. The social brain hypothesis suggests that the evolution of the primate brain has been driven by the necessity of dealing with increased social complexity. This chapter uses social network analysis to analyse the relationship between primate group size, neocortex ratio and several social network metrics. Findings suggest that social complexity may derive from managing indirect social relationships, i.e. relationships in which a female is not directly involved, which may pose high cognitive demands on primates. The discussion notes that a large neocortex allows individuals to form intense social bonds with some group members while at the same time enabling them to manage and monitor less intense indirect relationships without frequent direct involvement with each individual of the social group.

The current study examined the roles of gender, and gender-role orientation in young adolescents’ empathetic concern. In addition, this study aimed to explore the contribution of Theory of Mind in participants’ empathetic concern. Finally, this study examined whether gender and gender-role orientation were implicated in emerging adolescents’ Theory of Mind understanding. One-hundred-fifty 11- to 12-year-olds (79 self-identified females) completed questionnaires measuring their empathetic concern, Theory of Mind, and their perceived gender-role orientation. Results showed that gender-role orientation, specifically, femininity and masculinity predicted empathetic concern above and beyond gender. In addition, the effects of cognitive and affective Theory of Mind are explored and discussed in relation to empathetic concern. Finally, neither gender nor gender-role orientation was found to contribute to participants’ Theory of Mind understanding. These findings suggest that emerging adolescents’ perceived gender roles, as well as their ability to consider another’s beliefs, play a role in their expression of empathetic concern.

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