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This paper examines a market where the provision of information service is costly, but information service has the characteristics of a public good. Consumers, on the other hand, can use the information service to make an informed purchase decision and derive higher utility from consuming their ideal product. However, after receiving the information service from an information service provider, consumers can easily free ride by purchasing at low-price sellers who do not provide any information service. The paper examines the competition where sellers compete by providing information service for horizontally differentiated products and where technology reduces consumers' search cost. It is found that in this market a seller needs to establish itself as an information service provider in order to make positive profits, even when there is free riding. A seller, however, cannot make positive profits by free riding all the time. Also, with an increase in competition in the information service market, sellers have reduced incentives to provide information service. It is also found that in this market a decrease in search cost may increase or decrease social welfare.free riding, search cost, electronic markets, electronic commerce

The information systems (IS) literature suggests that by lowering coordination costs, information technology (IT) will lead to an overall shift towards more use of markets. Empirical work in this area provides evidence that IT is associated with a decrease in vertical integration (VI). Economy-wide data, however, suggests that over the last 25 years the average level of VI has, in fact, increased. This paper studies this empirical anomaly by explicating the moderating impact of two measures of competitive environment, demand uncertainty, and industry concentration, on the relationship between IT and VI. We examine firms included in 1995 to 1997 InformationWeek 500 and the COMPUSTAT database. Consistent with the IS literature, the analysis suggests that IT is associated with a decrease in VI when demand uncertainty is high or industry concentration is low. However, contrary to the IS literature, IT is found to be associated with an increase in VI when industry concentration is high or demand uncertainty is low. Furthermore, as demand uncertainty increases, less vertically integrated firms invest more in IT, while as industry concentration increases, more vertically integrated firms invest more in IT. The analysis also suggests that firms' choice of the level of VI and IT investment, under different levels of demand uncertainty and industry concentration, are rational. When demand uncertainty is high or industry concentration is low, increase in VI may increase coordination and production costs. Thus, less VI is rational. However, when industry concentration is high or demand uncertainty is low, increase in VI may decrease coordination and production costs. Thus, firms choose more VI in such industries. The implications for research and practice are discussed.

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