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SUMMARY This study investigates the impact of backscratching between the CEO and directors on a firm's future performance, financial reporting quality, and audit fees. We find that the presence and extent of boardroom backscratching are associated with weaker future performance, poorer quality financial reporting, and higher audit fees. We attribute these findings to backscratching firms' increased business and information risks inducing auditors to exert greater effort and charge risk premiums in response to heightened audit engagement risks. We observe consistent results when extending our investigation to backscratching between the CEO and audit committee and between the CEO and the CFO, given that the audit committee and the CFO influence financial reporting quality. Finally, we provide evidence that backscratching firms display greater audit report lag and a higher likelihood of receiving a going concern audit opinion. Our study offers insights to regulators concerning policy development to strengthen board effectiveness and remuneration disclosures.

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There has been recent and growing criticism of the usefulness of financial reporting for investors, particularly the annual financial statements. In response, the IASB is pursuing several projects aimed at improving the relevance of financial information. To inform the IASB's work, we investigate, using a mixed-method approach, the extent and nature of the use of annual financial statements by equity investors. We examine the relevance of financial reporting for equity valuation in Australia across time. We find that financial reporting (specifically, reported net income, shareholders' equity, and operating cash flows) remains relevant for investment decisions. We further support this finding with evidence from field interviews that provide insight into how and why financial statements are used by equity investors. The field evidence also demonstrates that no one financial statement dominates in investor decision making. Given the increasing availability of more timely, forward-looking information from alternative sources, we examine the relevance of non-GAAP financial information and other non-financial information for investor decision making. We find that non-GAAP financial information (as proxied by EBIT and EBITDA) is more value relevant than statutory measures. We further find a broad range of non-financial information is utilized by investors in making investment decisions both as a 'screen' and for valuation purposes. Our findings inform regulators and other stakeholders as we provide evidence of the continuing relevance of financial statements and the complementary role of non-GAAP financial and other information. Our evidence provides a rebuttal to the recent criticism.

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