The goal of the present study was to investigate relationships between personal beliefs about memory, metacognitive beliefs, and actual memory performance. One hundred thirty-seven participants' (aged 20 to 60 years) metacognitive beliefs were measured using the Metacognition Questionnaire (MCQ-30), memory beliefs were measured using the Personal Beliefs about Memory Instrument (PBMI), and an episodic memory task was used to measure actual memory performance, memory predictions, and postdictions. Younger adults had lower scores on the positive beliefs subfactor of the MCQ-30, higher scores on retrospective change and control subfactors of the PBMI, and outperformed middle-aged adults on recall and recall postdiction. Path analysis showed that individuals' beliefs about memory mediate the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and actual memory performance. Specifically, low lack of confidence (or less worry) in one's own memory and attentional capabilities was related to higher memory performance and positive personal beliefs regarding specific memory ability mediated relationship.

Feeling of knowing (FOK) is a metacognitive process which allows individuals to predict the likelihood that they will be able to remember, in the future, information which they currently cannot recall. Although FOK provides evidence for the mechanisms of metacognitive systems, the neurobiological basis of FOK is still unclear. We investigated the neural correlates of FOK induced by an episodic memory task in 77 younger adult participants. Data were gathered using eventrelated potentials (ERPs). ERP components during high, low, extremely high and extremely low FOK judgments were analyzed. Stimulus-locked ERP analyses indicated that FOK judgment was associated with greater positivity for P200 component at frontal, central, and parietal electrode zones and greater negativity for the N200 component at parietal electrode zones. Furthermore, results revealed that amplitude of the ERP components for FOK judgments were affected by the level of FOK judgment. Results suggest that ERP components of FOK judgment observed within a 200 ms time window support the perceptual fluency-based model.

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Although memory is constantly monitored and controlled by the metacognitive system, little is known about how people monitor memory conformity, incorporating information in others' memories into one's memory of a specific event. In this study, we tested participants' memory for a seemingly shared event and asked them to report their confidence in their answers both individually and jointly. We also explored the relationships between specific individual characteristics, memory, and confidence variables. We have two critical findings apart from replicating the well-evidenced memory conformity effect. First, participants were privately more confident in memory decisions when they did not conform to their cowitness than when they conformed. Conversely, they were publicly more confident in decisions when they conformed than when they did not conform. Second, participants were publicly more confident when they conformed to an incorrect than a correct answer, social outsourcing the information when uncertain. These results indicate that the metacognitive system successfully monitors the social influences on memory, tracks the reliability of information presented by another, and refers to it in context-specific ways (i.e., public vs. private).

Directed Forgetting (DF) studies show that it is possible to exert cognitive control to intentionally forget information. The aim of the present study was to investigate how aware individuals are of the control they have over what they remember and forget when the information is emotional. Participants were presented with positive, negative and neutral photographs, and each photograph was followed by either a Remember or a Forget instruction. Then, for each photograph, participants provided Judgments of Learning (JOLs) by indicating their likelihood of recognizing that item on a subsequent test. In the recognition phase, participants were asked to indicate all old items, irrespective of instruction. Remember items had higher JOLs than Forget items for all item types, indicating that participants believe they can intentionally forget even emotional information—which is not the case based on the actual recognition results. DF effect, which was calculated by subtracting recognition for Forget items from Remember ones was only significant for neutral items. Emotional information disrupted cognitive control, eliminating the DF effect. Response times for JOLs showed that evaluation of emotional information, especially negatively emotional information takes longer, and thus is more difficult. For both Remember and Forget items, JOLs reflected sensitivity to emotionality of the items, with emotional items receiving higher JOLs than the neutral ones. Actual recognition confirmed better recognition for only negative items but not for positive ones. JOLs also reflected underestimation of actual recognition performance. Discrepancies in metacognitive judgments due to emotional valence as well as the reasons for underestimation are discussed.