Governments often place restrictions on the transferability of property rights to protect property owners from making "mistakes" such as selling their property under value. However, these restrictions entail costs: they reduce the property's value as collateral in credit markets, limit owners' ability and incentives to invest in the land, and create various transaction costs that constrain optimal land use. We investigate these costs over the long run, using a natural experiment whereby millions of acres of reservation lands were allotted to Native American households under differing land-titles between 1887-1934. We compare non-transferable land plots to neighboring plots held with full property rights, using fine-grained satellite imagery to study differences in land development and agricultural activity from 1974-today.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People promotes self-governance as a matter of justice rather than economics. How will self-governance affect the incomes of indigenous people? To gain insight, we compare long-run income growth on American Indian reservations with and without federal oversight through the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act. Reservations with more autonomy had 12-15 percent higher income per capita in 2016, even conditional on 1930s income. However, these more autonomous reservations also experienced wider income variance with more downside risk. The findings are consistent with theory emphasizing the development trade-offs between local and centralized governance.

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