ABSTRACT:In this paper I focus on the emergence of the concept of the "historical a priori" at the origin of Foucault's archeology. I emphasize the methodological function of this concept within Foucault's archaeology, and I maintain that despite the different thesis it entails as compared to its philosophical sources, it pertains to one of the main issues of phenomenology, that is, the problematization of the relation between reality as it appears in its historicity, and transcendentality. I start from the interest of the young Foucault in existential psychiatry, and I focus on the French philosophical context in which Foucault's Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger's "Dream and Existence" (1954) was conceived. My aim is to show that the first "phenomenological" phase of Foucault's work is coherent, from a methodological point of view, with the development of archaeology intended as "historical epistemology." I conclude by arguing that Foucault's archaeology is methodologically linked to Canguilhem's epistemology, in that the latter presents itself as an important attempt at linking together historicity and transcendentality.

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This paper aims to analyze Michel Foucault's position toward phenomenological psychology and psychopathology during the 1950s, in light of the new documentary sources available today. Our investigation is especially focused on one of the courses given by Foucault at the University of Lille between 1952 and 1954, namely, the course on "Binswanger and phenomenology" (1953-54). The analysis of this course, which was conceived by Foucault within the context of a philosophical reflection on the anthropological problem of psychopathology, will finally allow us to re-ascribe Foucault the place he deserves in the field of "philosophy of psychiatry".

Dans ce manuscrit du début des années 1950, Foucault met en relief la perspective freudienne qui substitue à l’approche biologique de la maladie fondée sur l’évolutionnisme une démarche basée sur la compréhension de sa signification psychologique. Cependant, puisque le point de vue évolutif n’est jamais abandonné par Freud, se pose la question de savoir comment, dans la définition psychanalytique de la maladie et de ses rapports à la personnalité, se distribuent les éléments d’une analyse évolutive et ceux d’une compréhension significative : quel équilibre peut être instauré entre eux, et quelle image de l’homme malade en résulte ? En outre, si la maladie a un sens, et si elle se définit par un ensemble de réactions significatives et cohérentes, en quoi est-elle maladie ?

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