This review of 122 research reports (184 independent samples, 14,900 subjects) found average r = .274 for prediction of behavioral, judgment, and physiological measures by Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures. Parallel explicit (i.e., self-report) measures, available in 156 of these samples (13,068 subjects), also predicted effectively (average r = .361), but with much greater variability of effect size. Predictive validity of self-report was impaired for socially sensitive topics, for which impression management may distort self-report responses. For 32 samples with criterion measures involving Black-White interracial behavior, predictive validity of IAT measures significantly exceeded that of self-report measures. Both IAT and self-report measures displayed incremental validity, with each measure predicting criterion variance beyond that predicted by the other. The more highly IAT and self-report measures were intercorrelated, the greater was the predictive validity of each.

This article was originally submitted for publication to the Editor of Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science (AMPPS) in 2015. When the submitted manuscript was subsequently posted online (Silberzahn et al., 2015), it received some media attention, and two of the authors were invited to write a brief commentary in Nature advocating for greater crowdsourcing of data analysis by scientists. This commentary, arguing that crowdsourced research "can balance discussions, validate findings and better inform policy" (Silberzahn & Uhlmann, 2015, p. 189), included a new figure that displayed the analytic teams' effectsize estimates and cited the submitted manuscript as the source of the findings, with a link to the preprint. However, the authors forgot to add a citation of the Nature commentary to the final published version of the AMPPS article or to note that the main findings had been previously publicized via the commentary, the online preprint, research presentations at conferences and universities, and media reports by other people. The authors regret the oversight.

Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However, a longstanding third perspective on morality, virtue ethics, may offer a richer descriptive account of a wide range of lay moral judgments. Building on this ethical tradition, we offer a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts. Because social perceivers are fundamentally motivated to acquire information about the moral character of others, features of an act that seem most informative of character often hold more weight than either the consequences of the act or whether a moral rule has been broken. This approach, we argue, can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments.

Three studies examined the relationships among anger, gender, and status conferral. As in prior research, men who expressed anger in a professional context were conferred higher status than men who expressed sadness. However, both male and female evaluators conferred lower status on angry female professionals than on angry male professionals. This was the case regardless of the actual occupational rank of the target, such that both a female trainee and a female CEO were given lower status if they expressed anger than if they did not. Whereas women's emotional reactions were attributed to internal characteristics (e.g., "she is an angry person,""she is out of control"), men's emotional reactions were attributed to external circumstances. Providing an external attribution for the target person's anger eliminated the gender bias. Theoretical implications and practical applications are discussed.

Abstract-In cases of wrongdoing, explanations of behavior that point to the relative uncontrollability of an action are often used to reduce moral culpability. For instance, the presence of an uncontrollable impulse has been used to mitigate blame. Accordingly, individuals who commit a crime because of an overwhelming emotional impulse (i.e., a "crime of passion") are often judged less harshly than they would be if they committed the same crime in a rational, deliberate manner. This is common not only in judgments of legal culpability, but also in naive judgments of moral blame. For instance, behaviors that are a result of internal impulses due to mental illness, extreme emotional episodes (as in "sight of adultery" cases), or undue suffering and pain are often considered instances in which the agent is compelled, albeit by a force internal in origin (an "irresistible impulse"), to behave in a way that under "normal" circumstances he or she would not. Control appears compromised under such conditions, and control is considered a necessary condition for the ascription of responsibility in nearly every normative theory of moral blame (Aristotle, trans. 1998;Fincham & Jaspars, 1979;Shaver, 1985;Simester, 1998;Weiner, 1995).Judgments of responsibility are not limited to cases of wrongdoing and blame, however; responsibility for a positive action can make an individual worthy of praise (although most research on moral responsibility has focused on judgments of blame; e.g., Alicke, 2000;Shaver, 1985). The research reported here focuses on how individuals take information about intention and control into account when arriving at judgments of moral praise versus moral blame.In many cases, praise for positive actions is discounted when there is an absence or reduction of control (Weiner & Kukla, 1970). For instance, when determining how much to credit success, individuals calculate the degree of controllability the agent had over the outcome and then use this information to judge the individual's causal responsibility for the outcome before finally determining how much praise he or she deserves (see Weiner, 1995, for a review).However, careful calculations of controllability are not so common when making judgments of moral praise. Impulsive positive acts, such as compulsively donating money (an act that one may regret at a later time), rarely receive treatment analogous to impulsive negative acts. There is thus an apparent asymmetry in judgments of moral blame and moral praise.It would seem rational to hold individuals to the same standards of responsibility regardless of the valence of their actions. According to Kant (1785/1998), for instance, acts that are in some way outside an agent's control, as positive as they might be, do not qualify for true moral evaluation. But an asymmetry may not reflect an underlying bias favoring positive acts. In cases of behaviors that are internally compelled, one way to judge the degree to which an individual is responsible for an action is to determine the agent's second-order desire...