Inferior parietal lobule (IPL) neurons were studied when monkeys performed motor acts embedded in different actions and when they observed similar acts done by an experimenter. Most motor IPL neurons coding a specific act (e.g., grasping) showed markedly different activations when this act was part of different actions (e.g., for eating or for placing). Many motor IPL neurons also discharged during the observation of acts done by others. Most responded differentially when the same observed act was embedded in a specific action. These neurons fired during the observation of an act, before the beginning of the subsequent acts specifying the action. Thus, these neurons not only code the observed motor act but also allow the observer to understand the agent's intentions.

Instrumental behavior depends on both goal-directed and habitual mechanisms of choice. Normative views cast these mechanisms in terms of model-free and model-based methods of reinforcement learning, respectively. An influential proposal hypothesizes that model-free and model-based mechanisms coexist and compete in the brain according to their relative uncertainty. In this paper we propose a novel view in which a single Mixed Instrumental Controller produces both goal-directed and habitual behavior by flexibly balancing and combining model-based and model-free computations. The Mixed Instrumental Controller performs a cost-benefits analysis to decide whether to chose an action immediately based on the available “cached” value of actions (linked to model-free mechanisms) or to improve value estimation by mentally simulating the expected outcome values (linked to model-based mechanisms). Since mental simulation entails cognitive effort and increases the reward delay, it is activated only when the associated “Value of Information” exceeds its costs. The model proposes a method to compute the Value of Information, based on the uncertainty of action values and on the distance of alternative cached action values. Overall, the model by default chooses on the basis of lighter model-free estimates, and integrates them with costly model-based predictions only when useful. Mental simulation uses a sampling method to produce reward expectancies, which are used to update the cached value of one or more actions; in turn, this updated value is used for the choice. The key predictions of the model are tested in different settings of a double T-maze scenario. Results are discussed in relation with neurobiological evidence on the hippocampus – ventral striatum circuit in rodents, which has been linked to goal-directed spatial navigation.

Spatial navigation can serve as a model system in cognitive neuroscience, in which specific neural representations, learning rules, and control strategies can be inferred from the vast experimental literature that exists across many species, including humans. Here, we review this literature, focusing on the contributions of hippocampal and striatal systems, and attempt to outline a minimal cognitive architecture that is consistent with the experimental literature and that synthesizes previous related computational modeling. The resulting architecture includes striatal reinforcement learning based on egocentric representations of sensory states and actions, incidental Hebbian association of sensory information with allocentric state representations in the hippocampus, and arbitration of the outputs of both systems based on confidence/uncertainty in medial prefrontal cortex. We discuss the relationship between this architecture and learning in model-free and model-based systems, episodic memory, imagery, and planning, including some open questions and directions for further experiments.

A growing body of evidence in cognitive science and neuroscience points towards the existence of a deep interconnection between cognition, perception and action. According to this embodied perspective language is grounded in the sensorimotor system and language understanding is based on a mental simulation process (Jeannerod, 2007; Gallese, 2008; Barsalou, 2009). This means that during action words and sentence comprehension the same perception, action, and emotion mechanisms implied during interaction with objects are recruited. Among the neural underpinnings of this simulation process an important role is played by a sensorimotor matching system known as the mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Despite a growing number of studies, the precise dynamics underlying the relation between language and action are not yet well understood. In fact, experimental studies are not always coherent as some report that language processing interferes with action execution while others find facilitation. In this work we present a detailed neural network model capable of reproducing experimentally observed influences of the processing of action-related sentences on the execution of motor sequences. The proposed model is based on three main points. The first is that the processing of action-related sentences causes the resonance of motor and mirror neurons encoding the corresponding actions. The second is that there exists a varying degree of crosstalk between neuronal populations depending on whether they encode the same motor act, the same effector or the same action-goal. The third is the fact that neuronal populations’ internal dynamics, which results from the combination of multiple processes taking place at different time scales, can facilitate or interfere with successive activations of the same or of partially overlapping pools.