We theorize that female candidates considering CEO roles will perceive greater termination vulnerability in such roles than their male counterparts. We further theorize that indicators of recent organizational distress will exacerbate female CEO candidates’ perceptions of termination vulnerability, while the presence of female leaders will mitigate these concerns. To test our arguments, we examine the initial values of newly appointed female and male CEOs’ severance agreements from 2007 to 2014. Results support our arguments and begin to shed light on the factors that influence female executives’ concerns about CEO roles and ultimately firms’ ability to appoint female CEOs.

Scholars have devoted significant attention to understanding the determinants and consequences of executive compensation. Yet, one form of compensation, executive severance agreements, has flown under the radar. Severance agreements specify the expected payments and benefits promised executives, upon voluntary or involuntary termination. Although these agreements are popular among executives, critics continually question their worth. Yet severance agreements potentially offer three important (but less readily recognized) strategic benefits. First, severance agreements are viewed as a means of mitigating the potential risks associated with job changes; thus, they can serve as a recruitment tool to attract top executive talent. Second, because severance agreements guarantee executives previously specified compensation in the event of termination, they can help limit the downside risk naturally risk-averse executives face, facilitating executive-shareholder interest alignment. Third, severance agreements can aid in firm exit, as executives and directors are likely to be more open to termination, in the presence of adequate protection against the downside. Severance agreements can contain provisions for ten possible termination events. Three events refer to change in control (CIC), which occurs under a change in ownership. These are (1) CIC without termination, (2) CIC with termination without cause, and (3) CIC with termination for cause. Cause is generally defined by events such as felony, fraud, embezzlement, neglect of duties, or violation of noncompete provisions. Additional events include (4) voluntary retirement, (5) resignation without good reason, (6) voluntary termination for good reason, (7) involuntary termination without cause, (8) involuntary termination with cause, (9) death, and (10) disability. Voluntary retirement and resignation without good reason occurs when CEOs either retire or leave under their own volition, and voluntary termination with good reason occurs in response to changes in employment terms (e.g., relocation of headquarters). Involuntary termination refers to termination due to any reason not listed above and is often triggered by unsatisfactory performance. Although some prior work has addressed the antecedents, consequences, and moderators of severance, the findings from this literature remain unclear, as many of the results are mixed. Future severance scholars have the opportunity to further clarify these relationships by addressing how severance agreements can help firms attract, align the interests of, and facilitate the exit of executives.

Context: Graduate medical education (GME) programs must develop curriculum to ensure scholarly activity among trainees and faculty to meet accreditation requirements and to support evidence-based medicine.Objective: Test whether research-related needs and interests varied across four groups: primary care trainees, specialty trainees, primary care faculty, and specialty faculty.Design: We surveyed a random sample of trainees and faculty in Kaiser Permanente Southern California's GME programs. We investigated group differences in outcomes using Fisher exact and Kruskal-Wallis tests.Main Outcome Measures: Research experiences, skills, barriers, motivators, and interests in specific research skills development.Results: Participants included 47 trainees and 26 faculty (response rate = 30%). Among primary care faculty, 12 (71%) reported little or no research experience vs 1 (11%) for specialty faculty, 14 (41%) for primary care trainees, and 1 (8%) for specialty trainees (p < 0.001). Submission of research to the institutional review board, an abstract to a conference, or a manuscript for publication in the previous year varied across groups (p = 0.001, p = 0.003, and p < 0.001, respectively). Overall self-reported research skills also differed across groups (p < 0.001). Primary care faculty reported the lowest skill level. Research barriers that differed across groups included other work roles taking priority; desire for work-life balance; and lack of managerial support, research equipment, administrative support, and funding.Conclusion: Faculty and trainees in primary care and specialties have differing research-related needs that GME programs should consider when designing curricula to support scholarly activity. Developing research skills of primary care faculty is a priority to support trainees' scholarly activity.

Laws in many countries mandate paying men and women equally when in similar jobs. Such laws, coupled with considerable organizational efforts, lead some scholars to contend that within-job pay inequality is no longer a source of the gender pay gap. We argue important differences in a widely used form of pay heretofore overlooked in existing studies—equity-based awards (i.e., pay where the value is tied to the employing organization’s stock, such as stock and stock options)—may cause underestimation of gender-based within-job pay inequality. Specifically, we theorize that because of differences in both why and how equity-based awards are distributed to employees compared to other forms of pay, a gender gap will exist in equity-based awards, with biased perceptions of retention driving the gap. Using a multimethod study with novel data from two technology organizations, archival data from publicly traded firms, and experimental data, we find consistent support for our hypotheses. Taken together, our results suggest that using equity-based awards as a means to retain employees, and the rationale and processes associated with distributing such pay, can result in gender-based within-job inequality. Thus, our study sheds light on a previously overlooked form of inequality in the workplace while offering implications for both theory and practice.

Abstract[Exerpt] Studying compensation in the nonprofit sector is difficult. In nonprofit organizations, it is not always clear what the objectives of the organization are and, therefore, perhaps even more difficult to consider how to compensate managers than in the for-profit sector. This paper investigates the determinants of executive compensation of leaders of American labor unions. We use panel data on more than 75,000 organization-years of unions from 2000 to 2007 which allows us to examine within union differences over time. We specifically concentrate on two issues of importance to unions -the level of membership and the wages of union members. Both measures are strongly related to the compensation of the leaders of American labor unions, even after controlling for organization size and individual organization fixed-effects. That is, within the same union, higher levels of membership size and average member wage over time are associated with higher levels of pay for union leaders. Additionally, the elasticity of pay with respect to membership for unions is very similar to the elasticity of pay with respect to employees in for-profit firms over the same period. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN AMERICAN UNIONSStudying compensation in the nonprofit sector is difficult. In nonprofit organizations, it is not always clear what the objectives of the organization are and, therefore, perhaps even more difficult to consider how to compensate managers than in the for-profit sector. This paper investigates the determinants of executive compensation of leaders of American labor unions. We use panel data on more than 75,000 organization-years of unions from 2000 to 2007 which allows us to examine within union differences over time. We specifically concentrate on two issues of importance to unions -the level of membership and the wages of union members. Both measures are strongly related to the compensation of the leaders of American labor unions, even after controlling for organization size and individual organization fixed-effects. That is, within the same union, higher levels of membership size and average member wage over time are associated with higher levels of pay for union leaders. Additionally, the elasticity of pay with respect to membership for unions is very similar to the elasticity of pay with respect to employees in for-profit firms over the same period.