Vaccination can sufficiently ameliorate the coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19). Investigating what factors influence vaccine uptake may benefit ongoing vaccination efforts (e.g. booster injections, annual vaccination). The present study expanded Protection Motivation Theory with possible factors including perceived knowledge, adaptive responses, and maladaptive responses to develop a proposed model investigating vaccine uptake among United Kingdom (UK) and Taiwan (TW) populations. An online survey collected responses from UK ( n = 751) and TW ( n = 1052) participants (August to September, 2022). The results of structural equation modeling (SEM) showed that perceived knowledge was significantly associated with coping appraisal in both samples (standardized coefficient [β] = 0.941 and 0.898; p < .001). Coping appraisal was correlated with vaccine uptake only in the TW sample (β = 0.319, p < .05). Multigroup analysis showed there were significant differences between the path coefficients of perceived knowledge to coping and threat appraisals ( p < .001), coping appraisal to adaptive and maladaptive responses ( p < .001), as well as threat appraisal to adaptive response ( p < .001). Such knowledge may improve vaccine uptake in Taiwan. The potential factors for the UK population require further investigation.

O objetivo do estudo foi verificar a importância da psicologia do esporte para treinadores. A pesquisa foi realizada com 59 treinadores (idade 34,98 ± 10,26 e tempo de prática 9,67 ± 8,91) de modalidades coletivas e individuais que responderam a um questionário especifico sobre a psicologia do esporte na prática esportiva. Os treinadores consideram todos os aspectos do treinamento importante, porém poucos conhecem o aspecto psicológico. A grande maioria considera importante a presença do psicólogo na equipe, mas deve atuar auxiliando o técnico, porém poucos concordam que ele possui conhecimento sobre o esporte. Futuros estudos são necessários para apontar quais são os temas da psicologia do esporte que os treinadores necessitam em sua pratica.

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Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven't been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases.

In this paper, we defend that demonstratives are expressions of joint attention. Though this idea is not exactly new in the philosophical or linguistic literature, we argue here that their proponents have not yet shown how to incorporate these observations into more traditional theories of demonstratives. Our purpose is then to attempt to fill this gap. We argue that coordinated attentional activities are better integrated into a full account of demonstratives as meta-pragmatic information. Our claim is twofold. First, we claim that pragmatically presupposing salience is a fundamental aspect of using demonstratives (predicted by their semantics and meta-semantics). Secondly, we hold that the pragmatics of demonstrating can only be properly understood in relation to meta-pragmatic conditions that have to do with joint attention. We use tests of truth-value gap as evidence for our claim. Our proposal provides us with a complete view of what speakers do and presuppose when engaging in acts of demonstrative reference through language.