This article identifies and compares the determinants of CEO compensation to median employee earnings with those of the Corporate Gini Index (CGI). Using a multinational retail company, the article posits that the CGI is an advantageous corporate alternative pay inequality measure that concerns CEO pay multiples to median employee earnings, which regulators should consider using and disclosing in proxy statements. Although CGI and the official measure of multiples of CEO pay to median employee earnings share some of the challenges, the advantages of CGI as an alternative measure are greater. Our findings suggest that the CGI is a much better measure of corporate income inequality bringing clear benefits at both micro and macro levels of intervention.

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relational or external-hostile), the chair of the board either takes the leadership role or a collaborative, joint leadership role with the CEO. When facing "tame" problems (transformational-internal or industry-external), a new CEO is often appointed to undertake an extensive diagnosis of the problem and take the lead, with the chair acting as a vigilant monitor. These findings are integrated into a typology of problems and board leadership approaches, augmenting the literature on complex problems. The study extends the application of agency and stewardship theories of board leadership by characterizing problems as contingencies that influence board leadership arrangements. It follows that regulators and boards alike should recognize the contextual nature of board leadership and leadership succession, and adopt a less prescriptive approach.

This paper utilises Stewart's model of role as a lenses from which to explore chairperson and CEO role dynamics in addressing strategic paradox and tension. Design/methodology/approach: The paper draws on 29 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with chairpersons and CEOs of UK-listed companies. Interview data is subjected to role analysis using Stewart's (1982) Demands-Constraints-Choice (DCC) model of role. Findings (mandatory): Findings indicate that relationship levels of trust, communication and chairperson time, enable strategic tensions to be raised and confronted in the relationship reducing defensiveness. Two distinct approaches to handle strategic tensions are found. The CEO-led approach predominates and rests on less flexible role boundaries, requiring the chairperson to proactively identify strategic tensions and perform an advisory/mentoring role. The shared leadership approach, less prevalent, rests on highly flexible role boundaries where the skills and experience of each incumbent become more relevant, enabling the separation of efforts and integration of strategic tensions in the relationship in a 'dynamic complementarity of function'. Research limitations: The study only applies to the UK context and is limited to contexts where CEO and chairperson roles are separate. The study draws on individual perceptions of chairperson and CEOs (i.e. not pairs). Practical Implications: The study provides insights to practicing CEOs and chairperson on two distinct ways of working through strategic paradox and tensions. Originality/value: The study adds to the scarce literature at chairperson and CEO roles and strategic paradox and tension.