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The aim of this study is to investigate prospective teachers' environmental education self-efficacy in terms of various variables. Survey method was applied in the study, and the data were collected in the 2015-2016 academic year. The study group of the paper consisted of 172 prospective teachers from each grade level who are studying in Social Studies Department, Faculty of Education, Afyon Kocatepe University. The data of the study were collected with the environmental education self-efficacy scale developed by Özdemir, Aydın and Akar-Vural. (2009). The 5-point Likert scale consisted of 15 items and had four sub-dimensions. As a result of the analyses, it was concluded that prospective teachers' self-efficacy perceptions of environmental education were moderate and prospective teachers' self-efficacy perception levels did not show a significant difference according to gender and grade level variables.

We study optimal taxation of savings in an economy where agents face self-control problems, and we allow the severity of self-control to change over the life cycle. We focus on quasi-hyperbolic discounting with constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution utility functions and linear Markov equilibria. We derive explicit formulas for optimal taxes that implement the efficient (commitment) allocation. We show, analytically, that if agents' ability to self-control increases concavely with age, then savings should be subsidised and the subsidy should decrease with age. We also study the quantitative effects of age-dependent self-control problems and find that the optimal subsidies in our environment are much larger than those implied by models with constant self-control. Finally, we compare our optimal subsidies with those implied by the 401(k) plan. Although the subsidy levels in the two cases are of comparable magnitudes, the 401(k) plan implies an increasing pattern of subsidies while the optimal subsidies decrease over the life cycle.JEL classification: E21, E62, D03.

We study optimal taxation of bequests and inter vivos transfers in a model where altruistic parents and their offspring disagree on intertemporal trade-offs. We show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, and whenever offspring are impatient from their parents' perspective, optimal policy involves a positive tax on parental transfers. Cautioned by the technical complications present in this class of models, our normative prescriptions do not rely on the assumption of differentiability of the agents' policy functions.