Enforcing compliance with rules and regulations in recreational fisheries has proved difficult due to factors such as the high number of participants and costs of enforcement, the absence of regular monitoring of recreational fishing activity, and the inherent difficulties in accurately determining catch levels. The effectiveness of traditional punitive deterrence is limited, yet current management is heavily reliant on this compliance approach. In this paper, the potential of behavioural based management is considered through a narrative review of the relevant literature; specifically, exploring the use of nudges, which aim through subtle changes and indirect suggestion to make certain decisions more salient, thereby improving voluntary compliance. This concept is explored with specific reference to the compliance of fishers within Australian recreational fisheries. There are only a few examples of behavioural based approaches found. However, based on their theoretical foundations, nudges may represent an inexpensive, and potentially highly effective tool for recreational fisheries management. Nudges do not offer a 'quick fix' to cases where traditional policy instruments have failed. Rather, there is the potential for behavioural nudges (based on framing, changing the physical environment, presenting default options, and social norms) to augment and complement existing deterrence regimes. A number of potential nudges for compliance management in recreational fisheries are suggested, but caution is advised. As with any novel management approach, nudges must be rigorously tested to demonstrate their cost-effectiveness and to avoid unintended consequences.

We investigate reference group formation and the impact of social comparisons on ultimatum bargaining using a laboratory experiment. Three individuals compete in a real-e¤ort task for the role of the proposer in a three-player ultimatum game.The role of the responder is randomly allocated. The third individual receives a …xed payment -our treatment variable -and makes no decision. The existence of a non-responder has a dramatic e¤ect on bargaining outcomes. In the most extreme treatment, more than half of the o¤ers are rejected. Behavior shows individuals exhibit self-serving bias in the way they de…ne their reference groups.JEL Classi…cation: C78, C91, D63

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water crisis looming in some Australian cities. In Sydney it is currently feared that without significant rainfall the city will run out of water within a few years. In the short term water restrictions have been implemented. Public attention has focussed mainly on technological solutions to the shortage. In Sydney there is debate over whether the water network should be expanded using either recycling or desalination plants. Similar issues are arising in other cities. The use of efficient pricing to ration available water resources, however, has received little attention. In contrast a number of water authorities have championed the use of increasing block tariff (IBT) as a means of conserving water. This paper considers the merits of these pricing reforms. In Sydney, as in most jurisdictions, the method of retail pricing of water has varied over time. Prior to 1993-94 the then Sydney Water Board adopted a form of IBT. Under IBTs the water provider sets a number of tiers of consumption levels. A low volumetric rate is set in the lowest consumption tier (tier 1) with the rate increasing in subsequent tiers. Prior to 1988-89, Sydney households were given a free allocation of water (that is, tier 1 had a zero volumetric rate). This was replaced by a three tier IBT from 1990-91 until 1992-93 (Sydney Water Board, 1994) and by a two-part tariff in 1993-94 which continued to apply until June 2005. A two-part tariff consists a fixed annual access fee (the fixed charge) and a single volumetric charge which is applied to all consumption. The nominal volumetric rate was 65c/kl in 1993-94 and had increased to 1.013$/kl by 2004-05. An IBT was reintroduced for 2005-06 and is to apply until at least June 2009. Urban water is priced differently to other goods. At times of shortagesnotably droughts-restrictions have been used to control consumption. In contrast, consumers are accustomed to significant variation in the price of virtually all other goods in response to supply side shocks. The recent history of oil prices is a good example. It is often argued that water is unique and should not be priced like other goods. This, as discussed below, is the underlying argument for the use of IBTs-a pricing mechanism rarely used outside the urban water industry. Implementation of IBTs is possible only because the use of a fixed network to deliver water allows water authorities to tag customers' consumption. IBTs cannot be used without tagging of customers. For example, suppose service stations sought to implement an IBT, say charge $1 per litre of petrol up to 20 litres (tier 1) and then $2 for each additional litre (tier 2). The likely customer response would be to purchase no more than 20 litres at a time. Thus, the IBT would be ineffective as no customer would purchase petrol in tier 2. A network is used to distribute water to urban residents because it is the least cost method of doing so. However, should the concomitant capability of providers

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