This study explores how authoritarian distributive policies may not only generate political support for the autocrat but may also help sustain powerful and lasting authoritarian legacies. We use microlevel data from South Korea's New Village Movement, a 1970s rural development program implemented under dictator Park Chung‐hee and widely touted as contributing to the country's rapid economic development. Our analysis shows that townships in receipt of larger cash transfers cast more votes for Park's incumbent party in the subsequent election. More importantly, we show that the effects of the subsidies still appeared almost four decades later in 2012, when the dictator's daughter was democratically elected as the president of South Korea. We show that these effects were not driven by villagers’ long‐term income gains or enhanced social capital due to the program but by the unwavering support of the beneficiary villagers for the dictator, whose legacy remained strong long after democratization.

New York City launched a restaurant sanitation letter grade system in 2010. We evaluate the impact of customer loyalty on restaurant revisit intentions after exposure to a sanitation grade alone, and after exposure to a sanitation grade plus narrative information about sanitation violations (e.g., presence of rats). We use a 2 (loyalty: high or low) × 4 (sanitation grade: A, B, C, or pending) between-subjects full factorial design to test the hypotheses using data from 547 participants recruited from Amazon MTurk who reside in the New York City area. Our study yields three findings. First, loyal customers exhibit higher intentions to revisit restaurants than non-loyal customers, regardless of sanitation letter grades. Second, the difference in revisit intentions between loyal and non-loyal customers is higher when sanitation grades are poorer. Finally, loyal customers are less sensitive to narrative information about sanitation violations.

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