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What causes petro-aggression? Conventional wisdom maintains that the regime type of petrostates has significant effects on a likelihood of petrostates launching revisionist MIDs While domestic politics is an important factor that explains the motivation and behavioral patterns of a petrostate, it says little about the international environment under which a petrostate decides to initiate conflicts. Petro-aggression does not take place devoid of concerns for the possible international backlash that its aggression could inflict on itself. One significant factor that presents opportunities and constraints for petro-aggression is a great power alliance. In essence, the great power has strong incentives not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic and economic reasons, and hence tends not to oppose military adventurism by its ally. Consequently, the petrostate's anticipation of great power inaction or even protection for its revisionist policy creates a moral hazard problem. Overall, by offering favorable circumstances, a great power alliance has a positive effect on petro-aggression. Although not without caveats, our large-n model and case study bear out this conclusion.

What determines states’ willingness to institutionalize alliances? Contrary to conventional emphasis on system-level conditions, we argue that states pay close attention to the domestic political consequences of institutionalizing alliances. This is particularly true for unequal allies. Client regimes are disproportionately sensitive to alliance design, as it affects patron allies’ ability to influence their military, distribute finance and arms, and legitimate preferred political groups. Two factors—power consolidation and political compatibility—determine whether the client views alliance institutionalization as complementary or conflictual with regime survival. The divergent alliance designs North and South Korea chose after the Korean War support our argument. An unresolved power consolidation process forced Kim Il-Sung to refuse formalizing the wartime alliance with the PRC, and Kim concluded a minimal treaty in 1961 after consolidating his power. In contrast, rapid consolidation left Rhee Syngman little to fear from continuing the highly institutionalized wartime alliance arrangement with the United States, which accepted his authority in the south. Our findings have important implications for alliance design, intra-alliance politics, and civil–military relations. Diseño de alianzas y seguridad del régimen de la política de supervivencia en la península de Corea

Abstract Is shale oil “revolutionizing” the global oil market and the geopolitics of oil? If so, how? While two aspects of the shale boom—a new source of supply and a cause for the price collapse in 2014–2015—dominate the conventional wisdom, I argue that the most revolutionary change is the least understood aspect of shale oil—shale oil producers’ rise as new swing suppliers due to its unique extraction technique and cost structure. Shale oil producers also differ from traditional swing producers in motives, contexts, and an amount of accessible excess capacity such that while shale oil lowers the medium-term price ceiling, it does not eliminate short-term price volatility. By examining the geopolitics of oil since the advent of shale oil, I analyze how such new market realities have or have not altered the US foreign policy on issues involving possible oil supply disruptions, Saudi Arabia's long-held special status in US grand strategy, rationale for US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and the foreign policy of China, the largest oil importer today, and Russia, a major petrostate.