This paper challenges the view that mental contents can be innate and offers instead a developmental model in which mental contents emerge from the interaction of genes, brain and environment. Some key steps on this developmental pathway are traced, such as the formation of image schemas. The processes by which mental contents are evaluated and organized are described, notably those of perceptual analysis, representational re-description and appraisal. Jung's concept of the transcendent function is seen to have certain crucial features in common with each of these processes. The emergence of the capacity to symbolize is explored in relation to these concepts and it is suggested that the pinnacle of this capacity is achieved in the emergence of reflective function, in which mind is represented to itself.

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The value of cognitive science as a means of investigating psychodynamic theory and practice is discussed and the limitations of this approach are described. Research findings from cognitive science are drawn on to clarify the nature of memory, which is seen to be a mixture of reproduction and reconstruction and the concepts of true and false memory are explored in this light. The part played by implicit memory and internal working models in producing transference is also examined. New ways of conceptualizing fantasy, which describes it as another facet of internal working models, and the role of transgenerational transmission of attachment patterns in creating internal working models are explored. The nature of archetypes is considered in the light of cognitive science research and a minimalist model is proposed, in which they can be likened to image schemas, that is, primitive conceptual structures that exist in a form which can never be experienced directly or indirectly.

In this paper I examine the various meanings of the term 'internal object' and the differences between various theoretical models for the formation of internal objects. I suggest that the idea in attachment theory of 'internal working models' emphasizes the internal world as one consisting of unconscious internalized patterns of emotional relationships. The term 'internal object' lacks this clarity and the different meanings it carries within differing theoretical frameworks are a source of confusion. I describe the role implicit memory plays in the formation of 'internal working model's and suggest that these offer us an alternative explanation for unconscious fantasy and for object relationships to that of instinctual drives. This model is then brought to bear on contemporary Jungian concepts of the internal world, with a suggestion that, seen in this light, Jung's formulation of the concept of the complex has many features in common with the 'internal working model' of attachment theory.

In this paper the differing psychodynamic models of defences are outlined and compared with an attachment theory perspective in which affect regulation plays a central role. Behavioural and intrapsychic distance regulation (defensive exclusion) are seen as the main strategies for affect regulation and are the manifestations of the habitual pattern of emotional regulation in the relationship between the child and the primary caregiver. A new perspective on unconscious fantasy is offered, in which fantasies are seen to be actively created as defensive narratives to protect the development of healthy narcissism and to become integrated into a person's internal working models. Archetypal defences are explored from a developmental perspective and some neurobiological issues relevant to defences are highlighted.