There may well be more than one dimension to the arms control picture which will remain unexplored. Perhaps there are others which could be invented, designed, discovered, or supplied. At the very least, there is one dimension which presently is only dimly perceived, and this dimension need not long remain out of focus.It is the nonconventional, the unconventional, and the &dquo;counter&dquo; efforts with which this paper is concerned. In the recognition that fundamental conflicts of ideology, objective, and policy will remain in world politics, and with the further understanding that the ultimate responsibility for the active conduct of conflict lies with the military arm of any government, it is a hopeful hypothesis which I put forward: Along the penumbra of warfare are to be found and developed positive and active techniques for the conduct of conflict-techniques which could make the weapons of our day less threatening and the measures adopted for their management sound and sure. Such alternative methods have as impressive a developmental future as have traditional methods a distinguished developmental past.
Some Initial AssumptionsLet us begin with the manifest evidence that conflict is basic. Let us assume that in world politics we cannot, in the foreseeable future, resolve large areas of conflict, were resolution of this order of conflict desirable at all. It is surely not necessary to spell out the underlying characteristics which distinguish tension, hostility, and conflict nor to call attention to the self-evident fact that the relief of tension and the moderation of hostility do not remove the occasional necessity to engage in conflict. The containment of conflict and the continuing need to conduct conflict are matters with which both statesman and soldier will forever be concerned.The destructive capacity which science and technology have put in their hands is, quite clearly, the heart of the problem.Those of us who sit on the periphery have come to realize that we, too, may be on the front line of destruction, immediate and possibly total. And so we take up tasks which, at an earlier time, we were content to leave to those who profess the arts of war and to others who actively engage in governing.Never before have statesman and soldier alike received so much advice. Studies and proposals, as well as popular movements and pressures, are legion. Our policy-makers are thereby provided with more choices than they have ever had before. By the same token, their decisions are made more difficult.
