This article uses the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) fragile states framework to evaluate fragile state transitions. Our objective is to find out why some states considered fragile have recovered, while others remain fragile for long periods. We identify three categories of countries: those in a fragility trap, those that have exited it, and those that fluctuate between fragility and stability. CIFP data are used to examine state transitions for each category. One state from each category is then subjected to further country-level analysis. Our findings reinforce the view that state transitions do not follow a unique path and that effective engagement in fragile states requires different approaches across cases.

This article uses the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) fragile states framework to evaluate fragile state transitions. Our objective is to find out why some states considered fragile have recovered, while others remain fragile for long periods. We identify three categories of countries: those in a fragility trap, those that have exited it, and those that fluctuate between fragility and stability. CIFP data are used to examine state transitions for each category. One state from each category is then subjected to further country-level analysis. Our findings reinforce the view that state transitions do not follow a unique path and that effective engagement in fragile states requires different approaches across cases. Keywords: Bangladesh; Laos; state fragility; transitions; Yemen; CIFP IntroductionThe majority of research on state fragility has, thus far, focused on its causes and consequences.1 Policy responses have been purely reactive, leading to costly, ineffective outcomes and often-irreversible situations which require massive amounts of resources and sustained engagement to remedy.2 Our objective in this article is to determine why some countries that were once considered fragile have successfully recovered, while others remain fragile for long periods of time. If successful, such a comparison could provide valuable insights on how states that are slipping into deeper fragility can be prevented from doing so.

The failure of regional organizations and states to fully embrace the responsibility to protect (R2P) agenda has led to the creation of a ‘responsibility gap’ that is being filled by local actors and non-governmental organizations. This chapter examines the influence that this lack of engagement at the regional and national level has had on our ability to prevent the outbreak of conflict, mass atrocities, and crimes against humanity. In doing so, it provides an updated evaluation of the role of regional organizations in implementing R2P principles. It concludes by noting that evidence of a strengthened R2P agenda is difficult to find.

No abstract

No abstract