No abstract

No abstract

This article examines the effect of state legislative term limits on government debt levels. Past research has shown the influence of term limits on spending, but the effect of term limits on state debt is arguably more important in considering their desirability. We explain the relation between term limits and debt using the expected impact of changes in the composition, institutional dynamics, and behavior of state legislatures after term limits take effect. The hypothesis is that term limits will increase state government debt. Using regressions with panel corrected standard errors on data from the states between 1993 and 2008, the results empirically support the expectation that term‐limited states have significantly higher debt than nonterm limited states. Term‐limited states greatly increase spending while not increasing revenue levels and thus substantially increase debt. Since states with term limits have higher debt, we advise caution in adopting them. Related Articles:“Assessing the Impact of Term Limits on Competition in Florida and Maine.” (2009) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00163.x/abstract“A Matter of Time: Some Consequences of State Legislative Term Limits.” (1994) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1994.tb00317.x/abstract“An Analysis of the 1990–1992 Term Limitation Elections.” (1994) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1994.tb00340.x/abstract Este artículo examina el efecto de los límites de periodos de mandato para legisladores estatales en los niveles de deuda gubernamental. Investigaciones previas han mostrado el impacto de los límites de periodos de mandato en el gasto gubernamental, pero el efecto de éstos en la deuda estatal es probablemente más importante cuando se evalúan sus beneficios. Explicamos esta relación basándonos en el impacto esperado de cambios en la composición, dinámica institucional, y comportamiento de legislaturas estatales luego de que el límite para el periodo entra en vigor. La hipótesis es que los límites para periodos de mandato aumentarán el nivel de deuda estatal. Usando regresiones un Panel de Corrección de Errores Estándar en datos de los 50 estados entre 1993‐2008, los resultados apoyan empíricamente la expectativa de que los estados con límites tendrán un mayor nivel de deuda que sus contrapartes. Los estados con límites en los periodos de mandato aumentan de manera considerable su gasto mientras sus niveles de ingresos no aumentan y por lo tanto elevan significativamente su deuda. Debido a que los estados con límites en los periodos de mandato tienen una mayor deuda, recomendamos tener precaución al adoptarlos.

Ten years ago, some golf analysts believed that “drive for show and putt for dough” may no longer be true on the Professional Golfers’ Association Tour. Scholars analyzed data from 1991 to 2002 and found that the old adage was still true since putting remained the number one skill determining earnings. We updated their models with data from 2006 to 2013 and found that driving replaced putting as the number one skill determining earnings starting in 2011. The most likely reasons for this return to skill are the lengthening of the courses and the shortening of the rough.

No abstract