This article examines whether stales, in the role of “laboratories of democracy,” influence federal policy adoptions. Taking the recent past as the time frame, the article begins by examining major federal legislation to gauge the extern to which stale models were an influence. Following this, the focus shifts to important slate initiatives of the early 1980s, and their impact on subsequent federal legislation. The article concludes that the nature of the policy issue and the accompanying political dynamics are critical in determining whether states act as laboratories of democracy.

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Trust in government is essential to democratic practice. This article analyzed the factors shaping trust in the federal government using a survey of 260 Mexican immigrants living in rural Illinois and in-depth interviews with 32 participants. To analyze these data, we drew a distinction between support for the regime (system of government that is relatively stable in a political system) and support for authorities (those who temporarily occupy positions of power) to test whether regime or authorities' considerations shaped respondents' political trust. The results showed that both considerations influenced trust in the federal government. We also found that a perception of current leaders as being concerned with issues affecting Latinos and an increased optimism about the economic situation were key determinants in explaining trust in the federal government. Further, our in-depth interviews showed that respondents thought about economic issues, immigration, and overall assessments of the Obama administration when determining their level of trust in the federal government.

This article examines the effect of state legislative term limits on government debt levels. Past research has shown the influence of term limits on spending, but the effect of term limits on state debt is arguably more important in considering their desirability. We explain the relation between term limits and debt using the expected impact of changes in the composition, institutional dynamics, and behavior of state legislatures after term limits take effect. The hypothesis is that term limits will increase state government debt. Using regressions with panel corrected standard errors on data from the states between 1993 and 2008, the results empirically support the expectation that term‐limited states have significantly higher debt than nonterm limited states. Term‐limited states greatly increase spending while not increasing revenue levels and thus substantially increase debt. Since states with term limits have higher debt, we advise caution in adopting them. Related Articles:“Assessing the Impact of Term Limits on Competition in Florida and Maine.” (2009) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00163.x/abstract“A Matter of Time: Some Consequences of State Legislative Term Limits.” (1994) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1994.tb00317.x/abstract“An Analysis of the 1990–1992 Term Limitation Elections.” (1994) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1994.tb00340.x/abstract Este artículo examina el efecto de los límites de periodos de mandato para legisladores estatales en los niveles de deuda gubernamental. Investigaciones previas han mostrado el impacto de los límites de periodos de mandato en el gasto gubernamental, pero el efecto de éstos en la deuda estatal es probablemente más importante cuando se evalúan sus beneficios. Explicamos esta relación basándonos en el impacto esperado de cambios en la composición, dinámica institucional, y comportamiento de legislaturas estatales luego de que el límite para el periodo entra en vigor. La hipótesis es que los límites para periodos de mandato aumentarán el nivel de deuda estatal. Usando regresiones un Panel de Corrección de Errores Estándar en datos de los 50 estados entre 1993‐2008, los resultados apoyan empíricamente la expectativa de que los estados con límites tendrán un mayor nivel de deuda que sus contrapartes. Los estados con límites en los periodos de mandato aumentan de manera considerable su gasto mientras sus niveles de ingresos no aumentan y por lo tanto elevan significativamente su deuda. Debido a que los estados con límites en los periodos de mandato tienen una mayor deuda, recomendamos tener precaución al adoptarlos.

Young adults have particularly low levels of civic engagement. Incorporating experiential learning activities as part of the political science curriculum shows promise to reverse this trend. We analyze the impact of a mock presidential election simulation on the civic engagement of college-aged students. Exit surveys of student participants and a oneyear follow-up survey confirm that this experiential learning activity had a positive effect on participants' levels of political knowledge, their interest in public life, and their attitudes about government in general.