We investigate the factors that influence the extent to which a multinational corporation's headquarters (MNC-HQ) sources knowledge from the host countries of its R&D labs. We propose that the technological capabilities held by MNC-HQs present a paradox. On the one hand, they enhance MNC-HQs' learning capabilities. On the other hand, they reduce MNC-HQs' motivations to outsource knowledge from host countries. We also argue that it is important to consider both relative and absolute levels of technological capabilities, because relative levels can influence MNC-HQs' motivations to source knowledge from host countries. Statistical findings generally support our arguments. Journal of International Business Studies (2008) 39, 291–303. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400348

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In this survey study, we investigate factors that predict the extent of men’s engagement in housework in South Korea. Using data collected from 466 working fathers during the period from March 2013 to August 2013, it was found that a more egalitarian gender ideology and supervisor support for work–family balance were significant predictors of the frequency of men’s participation in housework (i.e., child-rearing activities and household chores), but that long work hours, which are prevalent in South Korea, moderated these relationships. More specifically, the condition of long average work hours reduced the positive effect of an egalitarian gender ideology and a supportive supervisor attitude on the extent of housework. Therefore, we contend that the effects of changes in individuals’ attitudes toward men’s housework will be limited without addressing cultural norms of overwork or “work devotion” in South Korea.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a new perspective on the marketing-R & D interface by modelling firms that develop new products in a duopolistic market. Design/methodology/approach – By using a game-theoretic modelling approach, this study examines strategic delegation, through which the marketing and R & D managers of each firm are given authority over pricing and new products’ quality levels. Findings – Interestingly, the study finds that the case where two managers with conflicting incentives negotiate (the horizontal coordination case) might produce a better financial outcome than when the managers’ decisions are perfectly coordinated by a profit-maximizing CEO (the vertical control case). In addition, the study identifies several conditions that guarantee horizontal coordination’s generation of higher profit, such as high (or low) sensitivity to the quality (or price) of a new product. The paper further shows that two competing firms may select horizontal coordination as a Nash equilibrium. Practical implications – These findings provide new insights into the role of marketing-R & D interaction under strategic delegation, which may allow rival firms to “spend smart” on R & D, avoid excessive (and unnecessary) quality competition, and thus enhance the profitability of new products. Such insights would be useful for any firms under budget constraints. Originality/value – To the authors’ knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to analyze how delegation interacts with the conflicting incentives of marketing and R & D managers, which in turn affects the quality investment decisions, competitive intensity, and, ultimately, the financial outcomes of new products developed competing firms.