Artigo recebido em 27.08.2017. Última versão recebida em 13.04.2018. Aprovado em 15.08.2018.

This study sought to discuss the governance structures adopted between livestock producers and their cooperative slaughterhouses in the chain of differentiated beef in the state of Paraná. The theoretical basis used was the Transaction Cost Economics and Measurement Costs Economics, complemented by the specificities of cooperatives. We conducted interviews with three key agents and eleven representatives of six cooperative slaughterhouses operating in this system. As result, we observed that the cooperatives have similar objectives and requirements, although there are differences in the levels of formality or flexibility. Although transactions are recurrent and have been successful, they involve a high asset specificity, depend on subjective measurements, and are still exposed to market uncertainties, which leaves room for the generation of conflicts and disincentives to quality. Despite this, the relational and reputational aspects associated with trust and partnership between the parties are elements that enable reduced transaction and measurement costs in these structures. At first, the measurements conducted by the cooperatives had an important role in the construction of trust between the parties and for value distribution. In a second moment, the trust built enabled the reduction of measurement costs.

Objective: To understand how the governance structure between producers and slaughter cooperatives of specialty beef chain in Paraná, Brazil, influence innovation and the remuneration of the value generated.Methodology: Semi-structured interviews were performed with 17 agents from two cooperatives and producers in the specialty beef chain in Paraná, Brazil. Originality: This study seeks to fill a gap in the literature by combining innovation and efficiency theories to assess how agents organize themselves enable them to create and remunerate the value generated.Main results: This study shows that producers and cooperatives organize themselves in a hybrid form involving verbal agreements which enable innovations due to information exchanges between producers. However, possible failures in value distribution stem from the non-remuneration of quality attributes, which may discourage innovations and the performance of the chain.Managerial contributions: Despite failures, cooperatives promote innovation and are a viable alternative for producers to compete in the market. Incentives can mitigate the risks associated with the observed failures. This study provides insights for private and public actions to encourage the formation of these arrangements and to improve the coordination of innovation subsystems.Theoretical contributions: Since efficiency theories underestimate innovation, our analysis employed efficiency and innovation theories, contributing to the better understanding of subsystems which depend on innovation to produce specialty products.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to understand the effect of governance structure alignment, property rights protection, and reputation in generating efficiency in dairy agro-industrial system in Paraná, Brazil, and Midi-Pyrénées, France. Design/methodology/approach Descriptive qualitative research, comprising semi-structured interviews with producers, processors and key agents of the dairy agrindustrial system in Brazil and France, in 2016/2017. Findings As a result, it was identified that measurement generates information about transacted dimensions and when it is shared can generate affect reputation in transactions that leads to system improvement. It was also observed that, in the dairy agro-industrial system, reputation acquired does not reduce all the measurement costs, as the product requires measurement in each all collection, regardless of the reputation created. Research limitations/implications As a limitation of the study, there is a difference in the moments when the interviews were done. In 2016, in France, the context was low prices, while in 2017, in Brazil, there was a rise in prices. This difference could have influenced some responses to the interviews, mainly about efficiency by producers. Practical implications Reputation, protecion of property rights by measurement and information sharing allows reduction costs (transaction, measurement and negotiation costs). This efficiency implies improvement to the system, in cases of milk producers and processors. Social implications Improvements in the dairy system can have repercussions on several other improvements such as better distribution of income among agents in the chain; better-paid producers, which implies the improving quality of lives of these people; better products offered to consumers. Originality/value From a complementary perspective of transaction cost economics and measurement cost economics, reputation and protection of property rights are discussed with a focus on efficiency. Empirically, the paper contains heterogeneous data collected from two countries: Brasil and France.

A cadeia de frutas, verduras e legumes (FLVs) brasileira vem demonstrando incremento na demanda e no consumo, seguindo uma tendência mundial e ocasionando maiores exigências de qualidade por parte do seu cliente final, além disso, a cadeia tem passado por uma reconfiguração com o enfraquecimento das Centrais de Distribuição (CEASAs) e surgimento de grandes redes supermercadistas, no segmento de distribuição e atacado. Ademais, a cadeia possui falhas de coordenação. Nesse sentido, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo conhecer como acontecem as transações e as estruturas de governança adotadas entre produtores e demais elos da cadeia de frutas, verduras e legumes no Brasil. Uma pesquisa qualitativa, descritiva e bibliográfica foi empreendida, a partir de estudos sobre o tema publicados nas bases Google Schoolar, SciELO e Portal de Periódicos Capes que resultou em 20 trabalhos selecionados. O método de análise foi a análise de conteúdo, com a utilização do software Atlas.ti®. Como resultados foi possível caracterizar a cadeia de FLV no Brasil, as transações e estruturas de governança adotadas, bem como problemas e falhas de coordenação foram encontrados, tais como: elevadas perdas e desperdícios; produtores pequenos e desorganizados, com baixa tecnificação; a possibilidade de poder de mercado de grandes redes varejistas; dificuldade de acesso aos canais para pequenos produtores escoarem suas produções. Tais questões são somadas à elevada especificidade temporal devido à alta perecibilidade do produto que tornam necessários requisitos de eficácia ao longo da cadeia para favorecer a entrega de um produto adequado ao consumidor final.