Turbulent Taylor-Couette flow in an annulus formed by two concentric cylinders with dead end walls was investigated with Laser Doppler Velocimetry (LDV). The test apparatus was designed to provide refractive index matching between the annulus and a working fluid of aqueous sodium iodide. LDV was used to measure the three components of mean velocity and turbulence intensity, concentrating on end wall effects. The flow Taylor and Reynolds numbers were T = 2.107 × 109 and Re = 73,440, respectively. Vector plots of radial-axial component velocities and contour plots of component velocities and turbulence intensities reveal the Taylor vortex flow structure at this high Taylor number.

This issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy is dedicated to topics in clinical ethics with essays addressing clinician participation in state sponsored execution, duties to decrease ecological footprints in medicine, the concept of caring and its relationship to conscientious refusal, the dilemmas involved in dual use research, a philosophical and practical critique of principlism, conundrums that arise when applying surrogate decision-making models to patients with moderate intellectual disabilities, the phenomenology of chronic disease, and ethical concerns surrounding the use of artificial intelligence in medicine. Throughout the issue, the themes of conceptual and moral boundaries in bioethics, critiques of current clinical ethics paradigms, and the importance of transparency are prominent.

In After God: Morality and Bioethics in a Secular Age, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. explores the broad implications for moral reasoning once a culture has lost a God's-eye perspective. In this paper, I focus on the implications of Engelhardt's views for clinical ethics consultation. I begin by examining the question of whether clinical ethics consultants (CECs) should advocate a particular viewpoint and/or process during consultations or adopt a neutral stance. I then examine the implications of Engelhardt's views for this question. Finally, I discuss some of Engelhardt's foundational ontological, metaphysical, meta-ethical, and epistemological commitments and how these commitments connect to his views on clinical ethics consultation.

Conceptual clarity is essential when engaging in dialogue to avoid unnecessary disagreement and to promote mutual understanding. In this issue devoted to clinical bioethics, the authors exemplify the virtue of careful conceptual analysis as they explore complex clinical questions regarding the essential nature of medicine, the boundaries of killing and letting die, the meaning of irreversibility in definitions of death, the argument for a right to try experimental medications, the ethical borders in complex medical billing, and the definition and modeling of complex disease states.

Head transplantation fits within the broader conceptual space occupied by transhumanists and others who seek to extend the lives of human beings indefinitely. It is reasonable to reflect on whether, under what circumstances, and in what ways human immortality would be good. In this paper, I disambiguate the ways in which immortality might be considered a human good and then argue that immortality is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for objective meaning in life. I also argue that mortality is not a necessary condition for objective meaning in life.