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Life is a complex phenomenon that not only requires individual self-producing and self-sustaining systems but also a historical-collective organization of those individual systems, which brings about characteristic evolutionary dynamics. On these lines, we propose to define universally living beings as autonomous systems with open-ended evolution capacities, and we claim that all such systems must have a semi-permeable active boundary (membrane), an energy transduction apparatus (set of energy currencies) and, at least, two types of functionally interdependent macromolecular components (catalysts and records). The latter is required to articulate a 'phenotype-genotype' decoupling that leads to a scenario where the global network of autonomous systems allows for an open-ended increase in the complexity of the individual agents. Thus, the basic-individual organization of biological systems depends critically on being instructed by patterns (informational records) whose generation and reliable transmission cannot be explained but take into account the complete historical network of relationships among those systems. We conclude that a proper definition of life should consider both levels, individual and collective: living systems cannot be fully constituted without being part of the evolutionary process of a whole ecosystem. Finally, we also discuss a few practical implications of the definition for different programs of research.

In the search for the primary roots of autonomy (a pivotal concept in Varela's comprehensive understanding of living beings), the theory of autopoiesis provided an explicit criterion to define minimal life in universal terms, and was taken as a guideline in the research program for the artificial synthesis of biological systems. Acknowledging the invaluable contribution of the autopoietic school to present biological thinking, we offer an alternative way of conceiving the most basic forms of autonomy. We give a bottom-up account of the origins of "self-production" (or self-construction, as we propose to call it), pointing out which are the minimal material and energetic requirements for the constitution of basic autonomous systems. This account is, indeed, committed to the project of developing a general theory of biology, but well grounded in the universal laws of physics and chemistry. We consider that the autopoietic theory was formulated in highly abstract terms and, in order to advance in the implementation of minimal autonomous systems (and, at the same time, make major progress in exploring the origins of life), a more specific characterization of minimal autonomous systems is required. Such a characterization will not be drawn from a review of the autopoietic criteria and terminology (à la Fleischaker) but demands a whole reformulation of the question: a proper naturalization of the concept of autonomy. Finally, we also discuss why basic autonomy, according to our account, is necessary but not sufficient for life, in contrast with Varela's idea that autopoiesis was a necessary and sufficient condition for it.

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