Utilities and electricity retailers can benefit from the introduction of smart meter technology through process and service innovation. In order to offer customer specific services, smart meter mass data has to be analyzed. In the article we show how to integrate cluster analysis in a business Intelligence environment and apply cluster analysis to real smart meter data to identify detailed customer clusters.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post, i.e., after an accident has occurred, in addition to the usual second-best contracts. Under moral hazard this always leads to a Paretoimprovement of social welfare. For adverse selection we find that this is also true except when bad risks under self-selecting contracts received an information rent, i.e., under monopoly or under competition with cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Regulation can be used to establish Pareto-improvement also in these cases. Privacy concerns do not alter our positive welfare results.Keywords: information moral hazard, adverse selection, insurance* This is the theoretical companion paper to a paper presented at the conference on "Die We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post, i.e., after an accident has occurred, in addition to the usual second-best contracts. Under moral hazard this always leads to a Paretoimprovement of social welfare. For adverse selection we find that this is also true except when bad risks under self-selecting contracts received an information rent, i.e., under monopoly or under competition with cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Regulation can be used to establish Pareto-improvement also in these cases. Privacy concerns do not alter our positive welfare results.

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he rise of Software as a Service (SaaS) composition platforms and so called Compute Clouds demonstrates the growing demand for the agile composition of Web Services. In order to facilitate the composition of services and value-creation, service providers need to collaborate. This collaboration is regulated by means of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) where the parties, the executed service as well as guarantees on the service execution are specified. This work presents the concept of Service Value Networks and Agreement Networks as the underlying legal structure. Furthermore, an approach is introduced that allows a service provider to select the risk-minimal SLA portfolio. In a further step, the approach is extended in order to allow for a tradeoff between risk and expected profit from the service execution. Finally, the computational complexity of the optimization model is discussed and solutions are proposed.

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