No abstract

En este trabajo se analizan los diferentes patrones de especialización productiva que han seguido inversionistas extranjeros en la industria del vino en Chile; en particular, el efecto de la estructura de propiedad que la firma escoge para su nuevo negocio vitivinícola. Existe evidencia que viñas organizadas como joint venture (JV) tienen mayor participación en los segmentos de vinos exportados con mayor valor unitario que las viñas que son filiales de inversionistas extranjeros. La hipótesis central bajo estudio es que para inversionistas extranjeros con producción más especializada en vinos de mayor R. JAVIER BUSTOS. Economista, área de regulación económica, Comisión Nacional de Energía.

This paper uses a model of strategic interaction among firms-that set discriminatory and nonlinear prices-together with public information on prices of the plans marketed by the three major mobile phone companies, to assess the extent to which on-net and offnet price differentials in the plans they offer could represent predatory practices in the mobile telephony market in Chile. The results show that these companies offered plans that could present evidence of predatory practices. Despite the fact that these plans were a small fraction of all the plans mobile phone firms offered they were recently banned by the antitrust authority as they represented a relevant fraction of all traffic.

Two main results have been obtained on the literature on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem. First, a contract specifying a price and quantity of the …nal good to be traded will, fairly generally, induce e¢cient investments if these are 'sel…sh' in nature, i.e., each party's investment directly a¤ects only his own pro…t (Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996). Second, and in contrast, no contract however complicated is of any value in reducing the ine¢ciency if the investments are 'cooperative', i.e., each party's investment a¤ects directly only the other party's payo¤ (Che and Hausch, 1999). We show that courts of law may play a more important role in real contract disputes than has been realized. The key observation is that the presence of a court can make it valuable to specify putative investment levels in a contract -even if the court remains ignorant of the parties' actual investment levels. This is because the putative investment levels in ‡uence the expected damages the court awards if it decides that breach occurred. The probability of the court deciding breach occurred is independent of the actual investment levels -they remain entirely unveri…able. It depends at most on the parties' court expenditures. These expenditures make litigation costly for the parties, and, therefore, in equilibrium they settle before trial. The presence of even such an imperfect court has a signi…cant impact on whether contracts alleviate hold-up ine¢ciencies. In the case of one-sided cooperative investment, we show that the …rstbest outcome can sometimes be achieved by the adoption of a simple non-contingent contract, contrary to the negative result of Che and Hausch (1999). Our result extends to the case of hybrid investment, provided the investment is mainly cooperative. for useful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are mine.

This paper evaluates the merits of the lawsuit that Chileʹs national prosecutor for antitrust matters (Fiscalía Nacional Económica -FNE)