RESUMEN:Construimos fronteras con supuesta base biológica y derivamos juicios morales de ellas. Asimismo, suponemos que fueron nuestras emociones -el miedo, el asco o la rabia-las que nos llevaron a tal error, especialmente cuando nos damos cuenta de la inconsistencia lógica de derivar juicios morales de dichas fronteras. En consecuencia, solemos identificar emociones con prejuicios, creencias u opciones falaces de las que más nos valdría librarnos. Sin embargo, como se tratará de argumentar a continuación, las emociones no son la causa del problema. Primero, porque el marco conceptual clásico dicotómico en el que razón y emoción son dos polos opuestos regidos por una tensión irreconciliable es a su vez cuestionable. Segundo, porque las emociones, en cuanto alarmas transmisoras de información relevante, pueden ser un elemento tremendamente útil en la identificación y superación de las discriminaciones surgidas de las fronteras dicotómicas. Así, el objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la relación de estos tres elementos, a saber, fronteras biológicas, juicios morales y emociones y, finalmente, argumentar a favor de las conexiones entre razón y emoción, mostrando los posibles beneficios de remplazar el modelo dualista por uno relacional.PALABRAS CLAVE: fronteras biológicas; juicios morales; razón; emoción; dicotomía; moral. ABSTRACT:We build boundaries that are theoretically based on biological grounds and we derive moral judgments from them. Likewise, we take for granted that emotions such as fear, disgust or rage were the element that led us to this mistake, especially when we realise the logical inconsistency of deriving moral judgments in this way. Consequently, we often associate emotions with prejudices, beliefs or fallacies, which we ought to free ourselves from. However, emotions are not the cause of the problem. Firstly, because the classical dichotomical framework that defends the reason/emotion polarity is also questionable. Secondly, because emotions, as alarms which transmit important information, may be a key element in the discovery and overcoming of the discriminations that arise at the boundaries of dichotomies. Thus, the aim here is to analyse the relationship between these three elements: biological boundaries, moral judgments and emotions. And then toargue in favour of the links between reason and emotions as a way of surpassing the old dichotomic model, and, to conclude, I will point out some of the benefits of replacing a dualistic framework by an interactive one.

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Our concern is with the ethical issues related to girlhood and bodily integritythe right to be free from physical harm and harassment and to experience freedom and security in relation to the body. We defend agency, positive self-relations, and health as basic elements of bodily integrity and we advocate that this normative concept be used as a conceptual tool for the protection of the rights of girls. We assume the capability approach developed by Martha Nussbaum as an ethical framework that enables us to evaluate girls' well-being and well-becoming in relation to the potential, and often subtle, threats they face. The capability approach can be understood as a theory of justice, and, therefore, as an ethical and political approach. An enriched concept of bodily integrity can help in the design of better policies to address gender biases against girls because it could contribute to seeing them as active agents and valid participants.

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