International audienceThe aim of this article is to analyze how market actors, and farmers in particular, mobilize collective coordination capacities to face global changes – market price or sectorial policies – within different regional contexts. A multi-scale conceptual framework is proposed to analyze market functioning and transformation over time and space. We extend Commons and Fligstein’s work on market institutions to define the notion of competition regime as a combination of four market institutions that legitimizes competition strategies. We also mobilize Ostrom’s work on common property rights regimes to show that a competition regime relies on the creation and management of two systems of common-pool resources, namely innovation capacity and reputation-building. This paper then shows the relevance of this framework through the case study of the current restructuring of dairy supply chains in mountainous areas in France. It shows that market liberalization strongly destabilizes the regional competition regimes that were based on the appropriation of social rights inherent to the national public policies. In the hybrid and specific competition regimes, existing territorial coordination devices are not directly threatened and can support the development of new cooperative strategies. In all cases, with the development of a contractual economy, farmers are incited to develop or to strengthen coordination devices to become effective market participants. Through the development of large territorial producers’ organizations capable of managing milk supply in volume and quality, they would be able to take part in the management of the supply chains. To do so, the present paper suggests that farmers’ organizations need material and immaterial investments and assistance from regional public players to build new local collective capacities. The competition regime framework is an asset for the design of such public supports in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, taking the regional specificity of the markets’ institutions and collective capacities into account

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global public health threat driven by a combination of factors, including antimicrobial use (AMU) and interactions among microorganisms, people, animals and the environment. The emergence and spread of AMR in veterinary medicine (AMR-V) arising from AMU in veterinary medicine (AMU-V) can be linked to individuals' economic behaviour and institutional context. We highlight the limitations of current microeconomic approaches and propose a mesoeconomic conceptual model of AMR-V that integrates actors' strategic and routine behaviours in their context from a dynamic perspective using the concepts of externality, globality and futurity. The global solution to AMR-V management relies on a trade-off between i) the global externality assessment of AMU-V with respect to AMR-V (public perspective) and ii) farm- or value chain-level marginal abatement cost evaluation (private perspective). The improvements realized by the proposed mesoeconomic conceptual model include i) the simultaneous fight against the emergence and spread of AMR-V and ii) a local decrease in AMU-V without any loss of competitiveness for private actors due to the development of adequate production standards. A set of generic equations describing the stepwise change in the scale of analysis is finally proposed. This original contribution to the global challenge of AMR through a mesoeconomic approach bring substantial improvement for better AMU. This model can be considered a way to smoothly promote institutional change and a call for public policies that support public private partnership in the development of adequate incentives. The model requires further development prior to its application in a given value-chain or territory.

Avec la suppression des quotas, les producteurs laitiers perdent un outil de gestion de la concurrence, entre producteurs et entre territoires, qui peut remettre en cause la pérennité de la production laitière dans certaines zones de montagne. Cet article questionne les conditions patrimoniales de son maintien. Trois formes de régulation patrimoniale alternatives sont analysées : la segmentation des marchés et le développement des filières de qualité identitaire, l’intégration dans la politique agricole de mesures spécifiques pour les producteurs de montagne et la patrimonialisation de leurs agricultures par les acteurs locaux. Sont mis en évidence, suivant une grille de lecture inspirée des travaux sur l’économie patrimoniale, le compromis institutionnel qui a permis la constitution de ce patrimoine, les ressources constituées en patrimoine et les communautés qui les portent. Enfin, la capacité de cette régulation patrimoniale à assurer le renouvellement des filières laitières de montagne et à ancrer la production dans les zones de montagne est évaluée. Alors que les quotas laitiers assuraient un contrôle des marchés à l’échelon européen et national, les régulations patrimoniales alternatives sont de portée régionale et n’assurent qu’une limitation géographiquement située (qualité identitaire) ou partielle (politique agro-environnementale et de la montagne, patrimonialisation locale de l’agriculture) de la régulation marchande par la concurrence. Ce changement d’échelle de régulation ouvre la voie à une différenciation des modèles de développement et pose la question des ressources financières et des compétences disponibles localement pour les mettre en œuvre.