This paper will review the emergence and adoption of decision heuristics as a conceptual framework within the avalanche research and education community and demonstrate how this emphasis on the heuristic decision framework has anchored and was critical in redefining the discussion around avalanche accidents. This paradigm has been a critical and meaningful step in recognizing the importance of decision making in avalanche accidents. However, in an attempt to reduce the incidence of fatal accidents, the adoption of these ideas within the wider avalanche community has overlooked some clearly stated limitations within the foundational work of the heuristic decision frame. With respect to the concept of heuristic traps in conventional avalanche education, the concepts are poorly operationalized to the extent that they are vague about what exactly they describe. The result is that as presently framed, they are of negligible value to avalanche education that seeks its basis on the best available information. We end with a discussion, and a call to action to the avalanche research community, of how we could move towards resolution of these weaknesses and add value to prior work on human factor research. Our aim is not to disparage the seminal, paradigm shifting work by McCammon, but rather draw attention to how it has been operationalized and how the industry needs to move beyond this paradigm to see further gains in our understanding of avalanche fatalities.

Prior research on the affect heuristic demonstrated that the more a person likes an object or activity, the safer and more valuable it is judged to be. That relation was found when judging stimuli at the categorical level (e.g., nuclear power, airplane travel, heart surgery). Yet risk judgments and decisions usually pertain to specific instances of an object or activity rather than their categorical representations. We examined whether the relation between liking and perceived safety holds across multiple judgments of specific instances of an activity distinguished by contextual information. In four studies (N ¼ 372), participants with domain-specific experience (backcountry skiers) completed multicue risk judgments under high uncertainty (judging the avalanche risk in backcountry skiing scenarios) and reported their degree of liking the scenarios. We demonstrate that the positive relation between liking and perceived safety holds across multiple judgments of specific instances of the activity. Furthermore, the liking-perceived safety relation (i.e., judging liked slopes to be safe, judging disliked slopes to be unsafe) held among backcountry skiers who like the activity and consider it safe at the categorical level. We discuss these findings from the perspective that contextual valence and perceived risk can dynamically diverge from categorical valence and perceived risk when perceiving specific instances of that category. These findings have implications for research on attitudes toward risk in extreme sports and other high-risk activities. Although it has been proposed that participants in extreme sports like risk and the thrill it provides, we found that backcountry skiers exhibit a healthy positive relation between liking and perceived safety when judging specific instances of skiing in avalanche terrain.

Deliberation is commonly assumed to be a central characteristic of humans’ higher cognitive functions, and the responses following deliberation are attributed to mechanisms that are qualitatively different from lower-level associative or affectively driven responses. In contrast to this perspective, the current article’s aim is to draw attention to potential issues with making inferences about mechanisms of deliberation based on characteristics of the observed decision outcomes. We propose that a consequence of deliberation is to simply reduce the likelihood of expressing immediately available (dominant) responses. We illustrate how this consequence of deliberation can provide a parsimonious explanation for a broad range of prior research on decision-making. Furthermore, we discuss how the present perspective on deliberation relates to the question of how the cognitive system implements nondominant responses based on associative learning and affective prioritization rather than voluntary decisions. Beyond the present article’s theoretical focus, for illustrative purposes, we provide some empirical evidence (three studies, N = 175) that is in line with our proposal. In sum, our theoretical framework, prior empirical evidence, and the present studies suggest that deliberation reduces the likelihood of expressing dominant responses. Although we do not argue that this is the only consequence or mechanism regarding deliberation, we aim to highlight that it is worthwhile considering this minimal consequence of deliberation as compared with certain higher cognitive functions in the interpretation of deliberation outcomes.

Linguistic polarity is a natural characteristic of judgments: Is that situation safe/dangerous? How difficult/easy was the task? Is that politician honest/dishonest? Across six studies (N = 1599), we tested how the qualitative frame of the question eliciting a risk judgment influenced risk perception and behavior intention. Using a series of hypothetical scenarios of skiing in avalanche terrain, experienced backcountry skiers judged either how safe or how dangerous each scenario was and indicated whether they would ski the scenario. Phrasing risk judgments in terms of safety elicited lower judged safety values, which in turn resulted in a lower likelihood of intending to ski the slope. The frame "safe" did not evoke a more positive assessment than the frame "danger" as might be expected under a valence-consistent or communication-driven framing effect. This seemingly paradoxical direction of the effect suggests that the question frame directed attention in a way that guided selective information sampling. Uncertainty was not required for this effect as it was observed when judging objectively safe, uncertain, and dangerous scenarios. These findings advance our theoretical understanding of framing effects and can inform the development of practices that harness question framing for applied risk perception and communication.