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La utilidad y pertinencia que las propuestas de la Nueva Gestión Pública (nGP) pueden tener en los países en desarrollo/transición han sido ampliamente debatidas. En particular, tres argumentos centrales han cruzado la literatura especializada. El primero, que podría denominarse de reforma por "etapas", sugiere construir una estructura burocrática à la Weber antes de intentar reformas neogerenciales. El segundo, que podría llamarse reforma por "saltos", implica lo contrario: la posibilidad de implementar la nGP incluso si no se ha construido antes una administración pública "tradicional". El tercero, finalmente, propone la posibilidad de concretar reformas administrativas por medio de una "combinación informada", es decir mezclando elementos de distintos modelos o paradigmas. Este ensayo busca analizar las tres líneas argumentativas mencionadas, para mostrar que cada una contiene afirmaciones atinadas y atendibles, pero también premisas discutibles y hasta equivocadas.Palabras clavE: Reformas Administrativas, Nueva Gestión Pública, Administración Pública Comparada, Países en Desarrollo/Transición. * Agradezco los comentarios de Alasdair Roberts, Javier González y Guillermo Cejudo a una primera versión de este texto. También agradezco el apoyo financiero que conacyt y la sEP del gobierno mexicano, así como el Government Department de lsE, me han brindado para desarrollar la investigación doctoral de la cual este documento forma parte.Estado, GobiErno, GEstión Pública The usefulness and relevance of New Public Management (nPm) reforms for developing/transitional countries have been widely debated. Three arguments in particular have crossed-cut the literature. First, an argument that might be called "reform by stages", which suggests the need to building a bureaucratic structure à la Weber before attempting neo-managerial reforms. The second one, which might be called "reform by leapfrogging", implies the opposite: the possibility of implementing nPm even if a "traditional" public administration has not been developed yet. Lastly, the third one proposes the possibility of designing reforms by way of an "informed combination", that is by mixing components from different models or paradigms. This essay seeks to analyze one by one these arguments, in order to show that each one makes incisive and important assertions, but is also based on disputable and even wrong assumptions.

Working under the assumption that societal pockets of low trust in government are likely to proliferate, this introduction to the special issue on “governance in low‐trust settings” integrates insights from the Global South and Global North to analyze how citizens respond to formal rules and service arrangements of public organizations they perceive as untrustworthy. We develop a typology of low trust responses—submission, avoidance, gaming, and resistance—as a counterpart to the well‐established exit‐voice‐loyalty‐neglect framework. We argue that these responses follow from institutional incentives and most likely emerge where people feel the system is not fair or feel like their back is against the wall, and they have the resources to game or resist the system. This article seeks to advance theorizing on governance in low‐trust contexts and enable a better understanding of citizen responses that are inconsistent with the governance mechanisms and service provision in high trust contexts.

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