The decision to vote in a national election requires a choice between serving a social good and satisfying one's self-interest. Viewed as a cooperative response in a social dilemma, casting a vote seems irrational because it cannot have a discernible effect on the electoral outcome. The findings of two studies with undergraduate samples suggest that some people vote not because they set aside self-interest, but because they expect their own behaviors to matter. Two psychological processes contribute to this belief: the voter's illusion (the projection of one's own choice between voting and abstention to supporters of the same party or candidate), and the belief in personal relevance (the belief that one's own vote matters regardless of its predictive value for the behavior of others). The rationality of these two egocentric mechanisms depends on the normative framework invoked. Their relevance for actual voting behavior is indicated by their ability to account for four types of variation in turnout rates.

In the prisoner’s dilemma, self-interest clashes with collective interest. The way players resolve this conflict affects how others view them. Cooperators are seen as more moral than defectors, and, when there is no information about the other player’s choice, cooperators and defectors are seen as equally competent. However, players who are defected against are seen as less competent, especially if they themselves cooperated (Experiments 1 and 2). Similarly, cooperators see themselves as more moral, but not as less competent, than defectors do (Experiments 3). Independent of concerns about reputation and self-image maintenance, evidential reasoning contributes to cooperative behavior. Players who project their own attitudes onto others are more likely to cooperate (Experiments 3). Compared with classic game theory, a theory of reputational concerns and evidential reasoning is better equipped to explain empirical patterns of choice behavior in social dilemmas.

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Gender stereotypes are understood as the ascription of different personality traits to men and women. Data from American and Italian samples showed that consistent with the attribution hypothesis, the estimated prevalence of a trait in a target group predicted perceptions of trait typicality well. In contrast, there was no support for the categorization hypothesis, according to which perceived differences in trait prevalence between groups should independently predict trait typicality. Nevertheless, participants overestimated gender differences in personality as predicted by the principle of intercategory accentuation. The implications of these findings for the rationality and accuracy of gender stereotyping are discussed.

Two game-theoretic arguments for the potential rationality of voting are presented. The first argument suggests that people make choices that allow the most favorable forecasts. People choose to vote inasmuch as they project their own choices between voting and abstaining more strongly onto members of their own political group than onto members of other political groups. Relevant evidence is reviewed and extended by new findings in a simulated public-goods dilemma. The second argument suggests that people preview how they will feel about each of the four possible scenarios generated by the conjunctions of their own choices (to vote or to abstain) and the election outcome (victory or defeat). They choose to vote inasmuch as they feel their own vote will not be wasted. The implications of both arguments for efforts to increase turnout are discussed.The scientific analysis of voting behavior poses many puzzles. The most fundamental question is why people vote at all (Lanning, this issue) if no individual vote can affect the outcome of a large-scale election with any detectable probability (Aldrich, 1993). Some researchers assume that the insignificance of an individual vote is so obvious that citizens justify their voting by other means. Two prevalent justifications include expressive voting (i.e., voting feels good and it contributes to one's reputation as a responsible citizen) and civic-duty voting