Reflexivity is a well-established theoretical and methodological concept in the human sciences, and yet it is used in a confusing variety of ways. The meaning of `reflexivity' and the virtues ascribed to the concept are relative to particular theoretical and methodological commitments. This article examines several versions of the concept, and critically focuses on treatments of reflexivity as a mark of distinction or source of methodological advantage. Although reflexivity often is associated with radical epistemologies, social scientists with more conventional leanings often speak of reflexivity as a methodological tool, substantive property of social systems, or source of individual enlightenment. Radical and conventional social scientists alike tend to stress the importance of being reflexive, as opposed to being unreflexive, but they do not share a coherent conception of what `being reflexive' means or entails. As an alternative to reflexive self-privileging, I recommend an ethnomethodological conception of reflexivity as an ordinary, unremarkable and unavoidable feature of action. The ethnomethodological conception does not support a particular theoretical or methodological standpoint by contrasting it to an `unreflexive' counterpart. It has little value as a critical weapon or source of epistemological advantage, which, in the present context, can have advantages of its own for promoting peace and epistemic democracy.

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This paper is about how natural objects are made visible and analyzable in scientific research. It is argued that the objects scientists actually work upon are highly artificial, in that their visibility depends upon complex instruments and careful preparatory procedures. Instruments and laboratory procedures do more than provide a window to the world; they lay the groundwork for specific analytic operations which utilize literary resources to represent phenomena graphically. Two specific cases from biology are discussed. The first is from a popular field manual, and is used to introduce themes for analyzing a more complex case, a neuroscience project using electron microscopy of brain tissue. The discussion of both cases concerns how specimens are modified into `docile objects' for purposes of investigation. These modifications are summarized under the headings of `marking', `constituting graphic space', and `normalizing observations'. Finally, it is claimed that these practices make up an `externalized retina' for scientific perception — a `retina' that depends upon disciplined conduct within the laboratory setting.

The term `sacrifice' is used by experimental biologists to describe methods for killing laboratory specimens. In Western societies, `sacrifice' usually connotes a process of `making sacred', a process Durkheim and his followers interpreted as a ritual transformation between `profane' and `sacred' realms. This paper examines whether `sacrifice' in the experimental context bears any relation to such traditional usage, or whether, as animal rights advocates argue, the term is no more than a euphemism for brutal and unnecessary slaughter. Drawing on ethnographic observations of laboratory practice, the paper argues that `sacrifice' means much more than simply killing a specimen, and that the violence done to the animal victim is part of a systematic `consecration' of its body to transform it into a bearer of transcendental significances. While scientists do not treat their practices as ceremonial rituals endowed with religious meaning, laboratory `sacrifice' is a part of a sequence of procedures through which the naturalistic animal body is transformed into an abstracted analytic object with generalized significance for members of the research community.

Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have grown interested in the daily practices of scientists. Recent studies have drawn linkages between scientific innovations and more ordinary procedures, craft skills, and sources of sponsorship. These studies dispute the idea that science is the application of a unified method or the outgrowth of a progressive history of ideas. This book critically reviews arguments and empirical studies in two areas of sociology that have played a significant role in the 'sociological turn' in science studies: ethnomethodology (the study of ordinary practical reasoning) and the sociology of scientific knowledge. In both fields, efforts to study scientific practices have led to intractable difficulties and debates, due in part to scientistic and foundationalist commitments that remain entrenched with social-scientific research policies and descriptive language. The central purpose of this book is to explore the possibility of an empirical approach to the epistemic contents of science that avoids the pitfalls of scientism and foundationalism.