No abstract

Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today's P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, asymmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and traitors. To tackle these challenges we model the P2P system using the Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma (GPD), and propose the Reciprocative decision function as the basis of a family of incentives techniques. These techniques are fully distributed and include: discriminating server selection, maxflowbased subjective reputation, and adaptive stranger policies. Through simulation, we show that these techniques can drive a system of strategic users to nearly optimal levels of cooperation.

SummaryLegionella pneumophila and Coxiella burnetii have been shown to utilize the icm/dot type IV secretion system for pathogenesis and recently a large number of icm/dot-translocated substrates were identified in L. pneumophila. Bioinformatic analysis has revealed that 13 of the genes encoding for L. pneumophila-translocated substrates and five of the C. burnetii icm/dot genes, contain a conserved regulatory element that resembles the target sequence of the PmrA response regulator. Experimental analysis which included the construction of a L. pneumophila pmrA deletion mutant, intracellular growth analysis, comparison of gene expression between L. pneumophila wild type and the pmrA mutant, construction of mutations in the PmrA conserved regulatory element, controlled expression studies as well as mobility shift assays, demonstrated the direct relation between the PmrA regulator and the expression of L. pneumophila icm/dottranslocated substrates and several C. burnetii icm/ dot genes. Furthermore, genomic analysis identified 35 L. pneumophila and 68 C. burnetii unique genes that contain the PmrA regulatory element and few of these genes from L. pneumophila were found to be new icm/dot-translocated substrates. Our results establish the PmrA regulator as a fundamental regulator of the icm/dot type IV secretion system in these two bacteria.

We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing her favorite bundle from among the unsold items at the posted prices. These mechanisms are simple, transparent and trivially dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC).We show that when agent preferences are fractionally subadditive (which includes all submodular functions), there always exist prices that, in expectation, obtain at least half of the optimal welfare. Our result is constructive: given black-box access to a combinatorial auction algorithm A, sample access to the prior distribution, and appropriate query access to the sampled valuations, one can compute, in polytime, prices that guarantee at least half of the expected welfare of A. As a corollary, we obtain the first polytime (in n and m) constant-factor DSIC mechanism for Bayesian submodular combinatorial auctions, given access to demand query oracles. Our results also extend to valuations with complements, where the approximation factor degrades linearly with the level of complementarity.

-We devise a simple model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and the effect of free identities on user behavior in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a strategic user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's generosity. The user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current burden of contributing in the system compares to her type. We derive the emerging cooperation level in equilibrium and quantify the effect of providing free-riders with degraded service on the emerging cooperation. We find that this penalty mechanism is beneficial mostly when the "generosity level" of the society (i.e., the average type) is low. To quantify the social cost of free identities, we extend the model to account for dynamic scenarios with turnover (users joining and leaving) and with whitewashers: users who strategically leave the system and re-join with a new identity. We find that the imposition of penalty on all legitimate newcomers incurs a significant social loss only under high turnover rates in conjunction with intermediate societal generosity levels.