Purpose The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the seeming paradox that underpins Nigeria’s war on corruption. This paradox centres on the undue interference of the presidency in the war against corruption. This interference has resulted in selective prosecutions and a deceleration in the tempo of the anti-corruption crusade. Design/methodology/approach The study used an admixture of primary and secondary data to evaluate whether indeed Nigeria is fighting against corruption to win it. The primary data were derived from key informant interviews. A total of ten diverse experts were interviewed through the instrumentality of unstructured set of questions, which were administered to them with room for elaboration. The secondary data were sourced from archival materials. Findings The findings of the study centre on three key issues: a characteristic one-sidedness in the prosecution of alleged corruption offenders by the anti-graft agencies. Those with pending corruption cases who have decamped to the ruling All Progressives Congress have had their cases placed in abeyance. There is evidence of the politicisation of the war against corruption as well as evidence of weak institutionalisation, which robs the anti-corruption agencies of the capacity to act independently. Practical implications The anti-corruption war may likely be derailed if the operational efficiency of the anti-graft agencies is not enhanced and their independence guaranteed. Social implications If the anti-corruption crusade fails, it will have multiple negative domino effects on national development and quality of life of the Nigerian people. Originality/value The paper is original because no recent study has interrogated the declining efficiency of Nigeria’s anti-graft agencies or linked this declining efficiency on weak institutionalisation and interference from the presidency.

Nigeria has been overly dependent on oil for its foreign exchange earnings and government revenue since the oil boom of the 1970s. Prior to this period, the country was reasonably self-sufficient in food production and carved a respectable niche for itself as a major exporter of several cash crops. However, as agriculture lost its primacy to oil, it went into steady decline due to neglect by successive governments. The neglect led to mass abandonment of farms resulting in extreme peasantization of the sector. A related negative fallout was Nigeria's transition from food self-sufficiency to food-dependency and attendant massive importation to bridge food gaps. However, efforts are being made by the government to reposition the agricultural sector to boost its productive capacity and make it competitive. The major task of this study is to evaluate Nigeria's quest to achieve food security against the backdrop of national insecurity. Considering the categorization of Nigeria as food insecure, the study examines the interconnection between national insecurity and food production as a prelude to the actualization of food security. The study relies on primary and secondary data to evaluate the feasibility of food security in the face of sustained insecurity across the country. The study finds that the achievement of food security would be impossible if the insecurity that pervades and envelopes farming communities is not resolved.

A profound change of the global food and agriculture system is needed if we are to nourish today’s 795 million hungry and the expected 2 billion people by 2050. Aside from hunger and malnutrition, food insecurity results in a wide range of problems such as health, environmental degradation, and a high rate of crime. When food security improves, most facets of life improve as well. While most Nigerians engaged in activities outside the agricultural sector, the country is in danger of being engulfed in a food crisis. Improving agriculture and food security (being able to produce enough food to sustain families and communities year after year), is a herculean task for the Omu-Aran community. There are no incentives for women to engage in commercial agriculture. Based on the above, this study tends to examine the role of women in proving food security and how this could help in the eradication of hunger in the Omu-Aran community in Kwara State. It argues that women have more restricted access than men to productive resources and opportunities including land, livestock, inputs, education, extension and research services, and financial services. Closing this gender gap would give an important boost to agricultural productivity and output, and in bringing agricultural yields similar to those of men, government at all levels, as well as corporate and financial establishments, must commit a large chunk of resources towards motivating women farmers. Role theory provides the theoretical framework for the study. The design for the study was both descriptive and exploratory. A two-stage sampling consisting of purposive and simple random techniques were used to select the respondents. The sample population comprises 35 food crop farming households in the Omu-Aran community. A structured interview was used to elicit information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. Twenty-five in-depth interviews were conducted. Quantitative data were analyzed descriptively while qualitative data was content analyses.

SUMMARY This briefing examines the forces behind and some of the consequences of artisanal oil refining in Nigeria. Critical political economy is used to explore the asymmetrical power relations between the people, government and oil companies, drawing on new material to account for an unexplored dimension of the marginalisation of oil-bearing communities.

This paper evaluates Nigeria's commitment to ending gas flaring within the context of the global quest for zero routine flaring by 2030. Nigeria has adopted a combination of strategies since 1969 to achieve zero flaring. Within this period, several unrealized flare-out dates were set. Several factors are responsible for the non-realization of the flare-out targets. These include Nigeria's weak institutional framework, the unattractiveness of economic payoffs associated with investing in gas-gathering infrastructure and the unwillingness of international oil companies (IOCs) to readjust their operations to accommodate zero gas flaring. Using data from secondary sources, the paper locates the non-realization of the various flare-out dates between legal enactments and economic permutations. A related factor is the huge capital outlay required to develop gas-gathering infrastructure vis-à-vis the uncertainty surrounding the gas market in Nigeria. The paper recommends the adoption of a holistic implementation strategy as a stimulus to extract commitments from all stakeholders towards zero gas flaring by 2030.