We used a newly developed experimental paradigm to investigate aftereffects of completed intentions on subsequent performance that required the maintenance and execution of new intentions. Participants performed an ongoing number categorization task and an additional prospective memory (PM) task, which required them to respond to PM cues that differed from standard stimuli in 1 particular visual feature. Although the feature defining the to-be-acted-upon PM cue changed in each block, the irrelevant PM cue of the previous PM task block was occasionally repeated in the subsequent block. In 4 experiments we found that performance in the ongoing task was substantially slowed for repeated PM cue trials compared to oddball trials, which also differed in a visual feature from standard stimuli but never served as PM cues. This aftereffect decreased as a function of delay after intention completion. These findings indicate that intentions can exhibit persisting activation even after they have been completed and may interfere with the execution of the new relevant task. Possible mechanisms and boundary conditions of this intention deactivation failure are discussed.

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Recent prospective memory (PM) studies indicate that intentions are not always directly deactivated after completion, but that they entail aftereffects in terms of slower ongoing-task performance and/or commission errors on repeated (no-longer relevant) PM trials. In four experiments, we investigated whether aftereffects depend on the similarity between completed and currently performed PM-tasks. Aftereffects were reduced when PM-cues differed between the two PM-tasks (symbols vs. words) compared to when PM-cues belonged to the same category (symbols vs. symbols). This could be explained by the new dissimilar PM-task shifting spatial attention away from repeated PM-cues and, thus, attenuating processing of these cues. Moreover, a switch of the PM-response (to or within the manual modality) did not result in erroneous retrieval of the no-more-relevant PM-response (i.e., commission errors) but in erroneous retrieval of the currently relevant PM-response (i.e., false alarms). In addition, aftereffects vanished in conditions, in which participants did not perform a new PM-task. This finding indicates that forming a new PM-task set might be a prerequisite for aftereffects when the ongoing task changes between the two subsequent PM-tasks. Finally, we did not find evidence that forming a new, dissimilar PM-task representation led to overwriting of the completed intention representation, and thus to a change of the content or destabilization of its activation level.

We often form intentions but have to postpone them until the appropriate situation for retrieval and execution has come, an ability also referred to as event-based prospective memory. After intention completion, our cognitive system has to deactivate no-more-relevant intention representations from memory to avoid interference with subsequent tasks. In everyday life, we frequently rely on these abilities also in stressful situations. Surprisingly, little is known about potential stress effects on these functions. Therefore, the present study aimed to examine the reliability of event-based prospective memory and of intention deactivation in conditions of acute psychosocial stress. To this aim, eighty-two participants underwent the Trier Social Stress Test, a standardized stress protocol, or a standardized control situation. Following this treatment, participants performed a computerized event-based prospective memory task with non-salient and focal prospective memory cues in order to assess prospective memory performance and deactivation of completed intentions. Although the stress group showed elevated levels of salivary cortisol as marker of a stress-related increase in hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis activity throughout the cognitive testing period compared to the no-stress group, prospective memory performance and deactivation of completed intentions did not differ between groups. Findings indicate that cognitive control processes subserving intention retrieval and deactivation after completion may be mostly preserved even under conditions of acute stress.

Previous studies have shown that completed prospective memory (PM) intentions entail aftereffects in terms of ongoing-task-performance decrements in trials containing repeated PM cues which previously served as PM cues triggering the intended action. Previous research reported that PM aftereffects decrease over time, thus revealing a specific time course of PM aftereffects. In the present study, we tested two accounts for this pattern, assuming either that the decline of aftereffects is related to the temporal distance to PM task completion or may be a result of the repeated exposure of repeated PM cues in the ongoing task. In three experiments, we manipulated both the temporal distance to PM task completion and the frequency of repeated PM cues and demonstrated that aftereffects of completed intentions declined with repeated exposure of formerly relevant PM cues. In addition, effects of repeated exposure were not only limited to the repetition of specific PM-cue exemplars but also generalized to other semantically related PM cues within the PM-cue category. Together, findings show that decreased aftereffects of completed intentions are not related to the temporal duration of the subsequent test block, but crucially depend on the repeated exposure of the previously relevant PM cues.