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The big data analytics (BDA) has dragged tremendous attention in healthcare organizations. Healthcare organizations are investing substantial money and time in big data analytics and want to adopt it to get potential benefits. Thus, this study proposes a BDA adoption model in healthcare organizations to explore the critical factors that can influence its adoption process. The study extends the technology acceptance model (TAM) with the self-efficacy as an external factor and also includes gender and resistance to change (RTC) as moderators to strengthen the research model. The proposed research model has been tested on 283 valid responses which were collected through a structured survey, by applying structural equation modeling. Our results portray that self-efficacy is a strong predictor of intention to use BDA along with other TAM factors. Moreover, it is confirmed by the results that RTC dampens the positive relationship between intention to use and actual use of BDA in healthcare organizations. The outcomes revealed that male employees as compared to female employees are dominant towards the positive intention to use BDA. Furthermore, females create more RTC than males while adopting BDA in healthcare organizations. Theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and future research directions also underlined in this study.

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer’s direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.

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