Second-order election models are based on several assumptions about individual-level motivations. These can be summarized by a transfer hypothesis: individuals presumably apply their evaluations of national-level phenomena to the EU level when voting in EU elections. In contrast, a suis generis hypothesis stipulates that voters evaluate the EU on its own performance terms. This paper tests these competing hypotheses. We find considerable support for both models. In the election context, where national institutions -political parties -dominate the representation process, the transfer hypothesis receives considerable support. However, we also find surprisingly strong support for the first-order hypothesis: electoral choice in EU election is influenced to a considerable extent by EU level factors. Furthermore, when voters evaluate the mechanisms of representation more broadly without a focus on elections per se, we find much more support for the first-order than the transfer hypothesis -voters clearly separate the two levels and evaluate each level on its own terms. These results have important implications, both for how we analyse voters' decisions in European elections, and how we view the sophistication of voters more broadly in the context of multi-layered institutions.

The paper compares trends and case studies of individual and collective employment conflicts in France and the UK. Its focus is on the extent to which conciliation, mediation and mediation are used within the two different industrial relations systems. In both, third-party intervention is associated with the legitimacy conveyed by the involvement of both employers and trade unions, or by the presence of an impartial judge. The research finds extensive use of alternative dispute resolution is taking place in both countries, with dispute resolution taking place commonly in the justice system in France, while in the UK there is extensive use made of the arms-length independent government agency, Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service. However, the research concludes that the most effective third-party interventions take place when they are combined with mobilisation, rather than merely being the sole form of dispute resolution.

There is significant resistance to vaccinations. Fewer than half of adults get a flu shot in the United States in a typical year, and a large minority of Americans say they will not get vaccinated against COVID-19. This resistance to vaccines creates challenges for both public health and the economy. The academic literature needs to consider potential policy solutions that might increase vaccination rates. In this study, we use experimental auctions to estimate how much university students need to be paid in exchange for agreeing to get a flu shot. These were real auctions where winners received compensation to get the flu shot. As found in prior research, the perceived stakes of such auctions incentivize participants to estimate the price at which they would engage in the auctioned behavior – in this instance, receiving a flu shot. We find that 50% require less than $1, and an additional 30% would get vaccinated for a payment of $20 or less. We also use a tobit regression to estimate bids as a function of participants’ demographic characteristics. If low levels of compensation increase vaccination rates, this has significant public health implications. The government may be able to achieve higher vaccination rates at a relatively low cost, particularly in comparison with the economic harms caused by illness. This study demonstrates that experimental auctions may be useful for estimating how much a larger, more representative sample would need to be paid in exchange for agreeing to receive flu or COVID-19 vaccinations.

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