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In this paper we note that when there is only one variable factor in the intermediaries' production technology, prices at different levels in the value chain will move proportionally to each other over time. This is also the only general condition under which the elasticity of price transmission is equal to one, so that retail price signals are perfectly transmitted to primary product producers and vice versa. This allows a test of whether derived demand elasticities contain information about consumer elasticities using only prices. An empirical illustration is provided using data from the Norwegian cod sector.

This paper tests empirically to what extent the rent in a limited entry and quota managed fishery is capitalized in the value of a vessel license. This is done by comparing the profitability of Norwegian purse seine vessels which received their licenses for free, to the profitability of vessels whose licenses were purchased along with the vessel. In a sample of forty-three vessels, thirty-one had obtained their licenses for free when the licensing system was introduced in 1973, whereas twelve owners had bought licensed vessels later on. Costs and earnings data for 1983 and 1984 show that those vessels which received free licenses have a significantly higher profitabilty than the other vessel group. The main reason for this is that the owners who bought licensed vessels had the highest capital costs. Policy implications of these findings are indicated.

The global aquaculture sector has grown continuously over the past 40 years, though unevenly among countries. Differences in factors such as inputs, climate, management, technology, markets, social environment, and institutions might be reasons for the disparities in growth. This study focuses on institutions, by analyzing the relationship between annual growth in the production of the major aquaculture countries and the quality of their institutions over three decades (1984-2013). Based on an ex-ante set of criteria, seventy-four aquaculture countries from five different regions-Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania-were selected. Annual percentage change in total aquaculture production, in terms of quantity and value, was used as a proxy for sector development. Three indices-governance, corruption, and competitiveness-were used as institutional quality proxies. Empirical results suggest that the aquaculture growth did not significantly correlate with the quality of institutions. By region, Africa had the fastest growth in the aquaculture sector, though from a low base, with 7.35% and 9.28% higher annual percentage change in aquaculture quantity and value respectively, than the Asian region. While, the European region experienced significantly lower annual percentage change in aquaculture quantity, a difference of 3.78% compared to the Asian region. Furthermore, the study found that total aquaculture production was not positively correlated with eco-label certification. The study is concluded by discussing the "aquaculture paradox."

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