THE significance of the Atlantic slave trade for African history has been the subject of considerable discussion among historians and merits attempts from time to time to review the literature. The present such attempt addresses several, but not all, the key issues that have emerged in recent years. These are, in order of discussion here: What was the volume of the Atlantic slave trade ? More specifically, what were the demographic trends of the trade with respect to regional origins, ethnicity, gender and age ? Finally, what was the impact of the slave trade on Africa ? In brief, what is the state of the debate over the slave trade ?My own position in the debate is clear: the European slave trade across the Atlantic marked a radical break in the history of Africa, most especially because it was a major influence in transforming African society.The history of slavery involved the interaction between enslavement, the slave trade, and the domestic use of slaves within Africa. An examination of this interaction demonstrates the emergence of a system of slavery that was basic to the political economy of many parts of the continent. This system expanded until the last decades of the nineteenth century. The process of enslavement increased; the trade grew in response to new and larger markets, and the use of slaves in Africa became more common. Related to the articulation of this system, with its structural links to other parts of the world, was the consolidation within Africa of a political and social structure that relied extensively on slavery. 2

This article provides a synthesis of the various studies which attempt to quantify the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Since the publication of Philip D. Curtin's pioneering estimates in 1969 (The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census), there have been numerous revisions of different sectors of the trade, and some scholars – notably J. E. Inikori and James Rawley – have argued that Curtin's global estimate for imports into the Americas is too low. When the revisions are examined carefully, however, it is apparent that Curtin's initial tabulation was remarkably accurate. The volume of exports from Africa across the Atlantic is here calculated at 11,698,000 slaves, while imports into the Americas and most other parts of the Atlantic basin are estimated to have been 9·8–9·9 million slaves – well within range of Curtin's original Census. Many of the revisions are based on shipping data by national carrier, rather than on series derived from estimated imports into different colonies in the Americas. Hence it is possible to substitute new data for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for many of the import-derived series used by Curtin. The results of these substitutions shift the distribution of slave exports over time but do not affect estimates of the relative scale of the trade by more than 2–3 per cent – hardly significant considering the quality of the data. Inikori and Rawley have failed to distinguish clearly between imports by colony and exports by national carrier; hence their global estimates have resulted in double counting. Further revisions are likely, nonetheless, but until the completion of detailed research comparable to the studies of David Eltis, Roger Anstey, Johannes Postma, and a dozen other scholars it is not possible to estimate the extent of future modifications. In the meantime, the current state of research on the volume of the Atlantic slave trade is summarized in a series of tables which analyse the export trade by time period, national carrier, and coastal origin. It is expected that the present synthesis will challenge historians to examine the impact of the slave trade on different parts of Africa, both to test the regional breakdown of slave exports and to assess the demographic, political, economic and social repercussions on Africa.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Boston University African Studies Center and Board of Trustees, Boston University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The International Journal of African Historical Studies. Historians have long appreciated the role of the desert edge in WestAfrica, but the recent sahelian drought and the tragedy it has entailed for so many people have accentuated the need to understand the relationship between desert and savanna.1 The drought, which began in some places in 1968 and continued in many areas until 1973 or 1974, has been the worst in over two centuries, but its economic impact on the savanna, although severe, has nonetheless been minimized because of a reorientation of the savanna economy toward the coast, a shift which dates to the beginning of the colonial period. With the end of the trans-Saharan trade, the redirection of overseas trade toward the Atlantic, and the development of peanuts as an agricultural export, much of the savanna gained new independence from the economy of the desert and sahel. Nevertheless, the area along the southern edge of the Sahara was extremely significant historically in the development of adjacent savanna regions before the colonial period, and it seems likely that the decline of the desert-edge sector was one of the most underestimated impacts of colonialism. The region offered an extensive market for grain, manufactures, and other products imported from the savanna, was a source of livestock, several types of mineral salts and transport services, and provided access to North African markets. In addition, it was the original home of many immigrant merchants, craftsmen, and farmers who contributed greatly to the development of the savanna. An examination of the desert edge therefore reveals the dynamics of economic change in the precolonial era and provides a comprehensive perspective on the recent crisis. lWe wish to thank

At a time when coastal West Africa was responding to the growth of ‘legitimate’ trade, the Sokoto Caliphate was experiencing dramatic expansion in the plantation sector. Plantations (gandu, rinji, tungazi), which used slaves captured by the Caliphate armies, were established near all the major towns and were particularly important around Sokoto, Kano, Zaria and other capitals. Plantation development originated with the policies of Muhammad Bello, first Caliph and successor to Uthman dan Fodio, who was concerned with the consolidation and defence of the empire. Besides promoting the economic growth of the capital districts of Sokoto and Gwandu, Bello's policy encouraged the expansion of the textile belt in southern Kano and northern Zaria. Similarly, the desert-side market in grain also benefited from the emphasis on plantations. The result was the greater integration of the Central Sudan region into a single economic zone. The role of plantations in the economy differed from that of plantations elsewhere in the world. Market forces tended to be weaker, and no single export crop dominated production. Rather, the orientation towards the desert-side sector indicates that opportunities for expansion were limited, while the importance of textile manufacturing reflects the relatively weak links with European and other textile production. Other differences included a system of Islamic slavery which encouraged emancipation, a close connexion with slave raiding and distribution, and a system of land tenure which often resulted in fragmented holdings. Stronger links with the world economy did develop in parts of the Caliphate towards the end of the nineteenth century. Nupe and Yola were drawn more closely into the world market through the greater use of the Niger and Benue rivers, but these changes only marginally affected the wider Caliphate economy.

P. E. Lovejoy —La kola dans l'histoire de l'Afrique occidentale. Le commerce de la kola, spécialement l'espèce Cola nitida, a joué un rôle considérable dans l'histoire économique de l'Afrique occidentale. La zone principale de production se situe dans la bande forestière, sur le territoire actuel du Ghana, de la Côte d'Ivoire, de la Sierra Leone, du Libéria et de la Guinée. La culture du kola-tier est probable dès le xive siècle, certaine au XIXe, associée à la collecte dans les peuplements spontanés. L'analyse linguistique (diffusion de la racine *guro) en situe l'origine dans la région frontalière actuelle Libéria/Guinée/Sierra Leone, où son commerce était déjà développé lors de l'immigration mande (xve-xvie siècles), probablement depuis le xuie siècle, sinon plus tôt. Les premiers cultivateurs étaient sans doute de langue ouest-atlantique ou mel, ultérieurement (xve siècle) supplantés par des Mande venus de la savane. La principale marchandise importée de la savane en retour paraît avoir été le fer ouvré. Plus à l'est, en pays Akan, le trafic de la kola aurait été associé à celui de l'or à partir des xive-xve siècles. C'est la seule zone où, pour des motifs liés à l'écologie, se développe un État centralisé lié à ce commerce. La révolution économique du xixe siècle entraîne une augmentation massive du trafic et de la production (i ooo % entre 1910 et i960) liée aux nouvelles facilités de transport maritime et terrestre.