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EU competition policy has become so strongly institutionalized that it is easy to overlook its precarious status in earlier decades. This article argues, first, that the Commission responded to the imperative arising from the extraordinary powers created by the treaty and the novelty of competition policy in post-war Europe by developing a series of myths to provide justification for its prerogatives. Second, these myths have played a key role in securing acceptance of EU policy, though other factors have also been important. Third, the official mythology has been supplemented by an interpretation which has become dominant in the law and political science literatures; namely, that EU competition policy has ordoliberal origins. This article challenges this view.

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The European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA) initiative, which is set to introduce ex ante regulatory rules for "gatekeepers" in online platform markets, is one of the most important pieces of legislation to emanate from Brussels in recent decades. It not only has the potential to influence jurisdictions around the world in regulating digital markets, it also has the potential to change the business models of the wealthiest corporations on the planet and how they offer their products and services to their customers. Against that backdrop, this article provides an analysis of the aims of and principles underlying the DMA, the essential components of the DMA, and the core substantive framework, including the scope and structure of the main obligations and the implementation mechanisms envisaged by the DMA. Following this analysis, the article offers a critique of the central components of the DMA, such as its objectives, positioning in comparison to competition law rules, and substantive obligations. The article then provides recommendations and proposes ways in which the DMAand other legislative initiatives around the world, which may take the DMA as an examplecan be significantly improved by, inter alia, adopting a platform-driven substantive framework built upon self-executing, prescriptive obligations.

An initial reading of EU competition law jurisprudence and literature may suggest that there might be a competition-related freedom in the EU, expressed along the lines of 'freedom of competition' or 'freedom to compete'. If competition is to be protected as a 'freedom' rather than merely as a 'policy', what this freedom involves should be established. It is important to establish the role of 'freedom', since it has been argued that EU competition law is a product of or has been significantly influenced by 'ordoliberalism'. Under ordoliberalism, protecting the 'economic freedom' of market actors is the aim of competition policy. This paper examines the entire jurisprudence of the EU Courts to establish the role of 'freedom' in EU competition law as perceived by the EU Courts. This inquiry establishes whether ordoliberalism has so fundamentally influenced the jurisprudence that welfare-based objectives cannot be adopted as an/the objective of EU competition law. This is the first such comprehensive study regarding 'freedom' in EU competition law. The paper demonstrates that there is little quantitative or qualitative support for the ordoliberal argument when one considers the relevant jurisprudence. A quantitative analysis of the case-law and in particular the historical trend raises serious doubts concerning the validity of the conventional ordoliberal-influence thesis.