Straipsnyje analizuojama Lietuvos užsienio politika, ypatingą dėmesį skiriant nacionalinio tapatumo ir užsienio politikos ryšiui. Autorių nuomone, šis ryšys gali būti raktas, nagrinėjant klausimus, ar išties Lietuvos užsienio politika pasiekė tam tikrą kritinį tašką, kurį galima įvardyti kaip tarptautinę izoliaciją arba bent jau kaip tendenciją ta linkme, o jeigu taip – tai kodėl?Atsakymas į iškeltus klausimus siūlomas toks – atsisakyti placdarminių ar bastioninių nuostatų, bandwagoning komplekso ir pradėti labiau pasitikėti savimi kaip demokratine nacionaline valstybe. Tam būtinos korekcijos ir vidaus politikoje. Reikėtų pereiti prie Lietuvoje egzistuojančių politinių srovių demokratinio „legalizavimo“.Kita vertus, būtų didelė klaida mestis į kraštutinumus, net bandant persvarstyti narystės ES ir NATO tikslingumą. Euroatlantinės institucijos lieka pagrindiniai stabilumo Europoje, kartu ir Lietuvoje garantai.

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This article is centered on the opportunities of small states in the emerging imperial world order. Particularly, policy options for Lithuania as a small state in the evolving new international arena are explored. The authors present a brief analysis of theoretical studies and historical researches on the empires and the roles of small states in imperial structures. The article focuses on the current characteristics of the U.S., Russia, and the EU core countries. This permits one to draw a conclusion concerning the imperial developments in domestic and foreign policies of these geopolitical actors. Having completed this analysis, the authors cautiously investigate foreign policy options for Lithuania that possibly follow from the interplay of the projects of the liberal global empire of American neoconservatives, projects of enhanced cooperation of the EU core and Putins policies to reintegrate CIS states under Russian domination.

In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially covered by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region. In the article are presented concrete cases revealing how this mechanism of a Russian hostage functions in political practice: by involving the Kaliningrad exclave into the high politics to create the air of its peculiarity, and at the level of the low politics, though keeping alive hopes of peculiarity in the exclave, by preventing them from being realised in practice, to tightly tie the Oblast to Russia. It is necessary to have in mind that there is no opposition between the high and low politics there.