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The purpose of this study was threefold: (a) to examine change in prosocial moral judgment over a 7-year period, (b) to determine whether there are gender differences in the development of prosocial moral judgment, and (c) to examine the interrelations of moral judgment, affect (empathy), and behavior in middle childhood. Participants were two groups of children who have been followed for 5 and 7 years and two groups of children interviewed for the first time at either ages 9-10 or 11-12. Hedonistic reasoning decreased with age; simple needs-oriented moral judgments increased with age and then leveled off; most other more sophisticated types of reasoning increased in a linear fashion with age. Modes of reasoning that most explicitly reflect role taking or empathy increased in use with age for girls but not for boys. Empathy was positively related to needs-oriented judgments and to higher-level prosocial reasoning and was negatively related to hedonistic reasoning (depending on the age of the children). Empathy was positively related to donating at 11-12 years of age but not at 9-10 years of age. Relations between behavior and reasoning varied depending on the structure and costs of a specific behavior. The results are discussed in relation to theory and research concerning developmental change in moral reasoning and possible mediators of prosocial development.The roles of affect and cognition in morality have been debated frequently. Some psychologists (e.g.. Kohlberg, 1984} have claimed that cognition and rationality are central to morality and that the role of affect is minimal. Others have asserted that affect, especially empathy and sympathy, often functions as a motive for moral behavior (Batson, in press;Hoffman, 1984). In recent work, the role of each has been acknowledged (e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, in press;Staub, 1979).Moral judgment is one type of cognitive process generally viewed as affecting moral behavior, including prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, 1986;Underwood & Moore, 1982). According to a cognitive developmental perspective, the quality of a prosocial action, that is, the maturity of reasoning underlying an act, is believed to change as the individual develops the capacity for higher-level moral judgment; moreover, mature moral judgment is presumed to be somewhat positively associated with quantity of prosocial behavior (Blasi, 1980;Eisenberg, 1986;Underwood & Moore, 1982).Researchers interested in the development of moral reasoning frequently have examined reasoning about moral conflicts in-

The hierarchical factor structure of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980) inventory was investigated with the Schmid-Leiman orthogonalization procedure (Schmid & Leiman, 1957). The sample consisted of 409 college students. The analysis found that the IRI could be factored into four first-order factors, corresponding to the four scales of the IRI, and two second-order orthogonal factors, a general empathy factor and an emotional control factor.

The way in which one copes with, or defends against, shame has important implications. The Compass of Shame Scale (CoSS) was developed to assess use of the four shamecoping styles described by Nathanson (1992): Attack Self, Withdrawal, Attack Other, and Avoidance. Reliability and criterion validity were explored (N = 322). Subscale reliabilities ranged from .74 to .91. Confirmatory factor analysis supported a model with four primary factors. A differentiated pattern of correlations was obtained between CoSS scales and general internalized shame, self-esteem, anger, coping, and psychological symptoms. Results provided empirical support for Nathanson's Compass of Shame model and the validity of the CoSS.

The way in which one copes with, or defends against, shame has important implications. The Compass of Shame (Nathanson, 1992) is a conceptual model consisting of four shame-coping styles: Attack Self, Withdrawal, Attack Other, and Avoidance. Participants rated the frequency with which they employed each of the shame-coping scripts across eight categories of shameinducing situations as described by Nathanson. The scripts were consistently applied across situations and the ratings were stable over time. A differentiated pattern of correlations was found between the four scripts and several indicators of psychological functioning. Results provide empirical support for Nathanson's Compass of Shame model.