approaches these questions from classical liberal, Lockeian premises. He asks us how, if we too support these principles (the ideas which underlie the Declaration of Independence and most of the American Credo), we can reach other conclusions. This is where this book, so largely theoretical, becomes a ripe subject for scholarly legal thought. If we follow the logic of these essays, it is imperative to reconsider many of the assumptions of our law. Is there an implicit right, perhaps under the 9th Amendment, of the citizen to determine his own life, absent some special overriding governmental need? This need may, the author concedes, arise in times of national emergency, or when individual behavior is thoroughly other-regarding. But otherwise, the presumption would seem to be in favor of the citizen. Yet, not exactly. For Walzer is a pluralist, a real old-fashioned one of the Figgis-Laski type. The individual is helpless before the state, so he must resist it or ignore it in groups, and these groups have a life of their own. The result seems to be that, as much as Walzer has rescued from the state, he snatches back to hand to the association. And here the author plays favorites. Not mean old corporations or absolutist churches, but good democratic groups. And, as much as he admires the Black Revolution, it does not qualify either. So, like Figgis and Laski before him, a comprehensive work of hautepolitique sometimes seems to end up as a nifty bit of special pleading for "our" side-here, the voluntary community of idealistic protesters. Walzer sees the problem and apologizes for the bias, but then proceeds on his way. This is understandable, but unfortunate, for beyond the advocacy (mixed with sage advice) is a fine work of general theory. JOSEPH 0. Losos* SENTENCING: THE DECISION As To TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE. By Robert 0. Dawson. ' Boston: Little, Brown and * Member. Missouri Bar.
