This article addresses the question of whether, or under what conditions, democratic institutions contribute to ‘developmental governance’ in sub-Saharan Africa, in forms such as coherent policy formulation, effective public administration, and limited corruption. While few dispute the desirability for Africa of democracy and good governance in theory, many remain sceptical about whether the two necessarily go together in practice. Using a simple framework informed by the new institutional economics, I analyse the impact of political institutions on governance quality in a sample of 38 sub-Saharan African countries. The main finding is that a combination of democratic contestation and institutional restraints on governments' discretionary authority substantially improves developmental governance. Judged against liberal democratic ideals, Africa's emerging democracies have many shortcomings. Yet the article shows that democratic institutions systematically enhance African states' performance as agents of development.

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South Africa celebrated ten years of democracy in April 2004 with a third round of national elections. The African National Congress — led by Nelson Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki — won another overwhelming victory. The country's transition will be remembered for the surprising ease with which seemingly intractable conflict was subjected to the routine functioning of democratic institutions. This essay analyzes South Africa's first decade of democracy — covering themes of electoral politics and administration, and government responsiveness and accountability. Perhaps paradoxically, the emergence of a single-party dominant regime has coincided with the institutional strengthening of political contestation and constitutional government. Implications for democratic consolidation and developmental governance are discussed.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison and Regents of the University of Wisconsin System are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to African Economic History. Onward then in battle moveIf the crops are yours then prove Show your freedom to the foe Onward Gold Coast farmers go.Father Gov'ment unto thee With our complaints we do flee Peace and justice is our cry Towards us turn thy justice eye.-from "The Gold Coast Farmers' Hymn," by Joseph Ben Gaisill A coalition of Gold Coast farmers, brokers, and chiefs disrupted cocoa export trade during the 1937-1938 season by refusing to sell their produce to the major expatriate trading firms. The cocoa "hold up," which was accompanied by a boycott of many European goods, was a response to news that the firms had reached a collusive buying agreement aimed at manipulating producer prices and fixing market shares. Word of the agreement arrived at a time when producer prices were plummeting.As the commercial stalemate dragged on through the harvest season, it became increasingly costly not only for the European firms and African participants in the cocoa sector, but also for the British colonial state. The state depended on external trade for revenue, and cocoa was the backbone of the external sector. 78 ROD ALENCENevertheless, colonial officials did not publicly discuss state intervention until after relations between the leadership of the state, the firms, and the African agrocommercial coalition had deteriorated, and stored cocoa had begun to rot. This discussion commenced with the appointment of the Commission on the Marketing of West African Cocoa (the Nowell Commission) to inquire into the nature of the trade dispute and make a non-binding policy recommendation. The Commission eventually proposed the establishment of a statutorily monopsonistic farmers' cooperative to be charged with marketing the entire Gold Coast cocoa crop.2 The proposal was never implemented, largely due to the outbreak of World War II.Despite sharp seasonal price fluctuations, the production and trade of cocoa were lucrative long-term economic enterprises. Therefore, the direct participants in the cocoa trade and the Gold Coast state appear to have had strong incentives to devise a form of commercial organization capable of averting deadlock. Their failure is puzzling in itself and is closely related to the expansion of commercially based political unrest during the late 1940s and 1950s.3 The Nowell proposal, though never implemented, set a precedent in official thinking with its elaborate case for permanent state regulation of colonial commercial organization. Beginning with the imposition of wartime controls during Worl...

State-controlled cocoa marketing was introduced in the Gold Coast during the Second World War and has had lasting impact. Most accounts of this change have emphasized the influence of metropolitan interests and ideas more conducive to state involvement in colonial economies. Although they explain the new found metropolitan willingness to ‘supply’ financial and administrative backing for state-controlled economic institutions, they neglect the sources of the Gold Coast government’s ‘demand’ for those institutions. I argue that pressures on the government to mitigate domestic social conflict caused by volatility in the world economy are crucial to understanding the shift to controlled cocoa marketing.