It is commonly believed that visual short-term memory (VSTM) consists of a fixed number of "slots" in which items can be stored. An alternative theory in which memory resource is a continuous quantity distributed over all items seems to be refuted by the appearance of guessing in human responses. Here, we introduce a model in which resource is not only continuous but also variable across items and trials, causing random fluctuations in encoding precision. We tested this model against previous models using two VSTM paradigms and two feature dimensions. Our model accurately accounts for all aspects of the data, including apparent guessing, and outperforms slot models in formal model comparison. At the neural level, variability in precision might correspond to variability in neural population gain and doubly stochastic stimulus representation. Our results suggest that VSTM resource is continuous and variable rather than discrete and fixed and might explain why subjective experience of VSTM is not all or none.T homas Chamberlin famously warned scientists against entertaining only a single hypothesis, for such a modus operandi might lead to undue attachment and "a pressing of the facts to make them fit the theory" (ref. 1, p. 840). For half a century, the study of short-term memory limitations has been dominated by a single hypothesis, namely that a fixed number of items can be held in memory and any excess items are discarded (2-5). The alternative notion that short-term memory resource is a continuous quantity distributed over all items, with a lower amount per item translating into lower encoding precision, has enjoyed some success (6-8), but has been unable to account for the finding that humans often seem to make a random guess when asked to report the identity of one of a set of remembered items, especially when many items are present (9). Specifically, if resource were evenly distributed across items (6, 10), observers would never guess. Thus, at present, no viable continuous-resource model exists.Here, we propose a more sophisticated continuous-resource model, the variable-precision (VP) model, in which the amount of resource an item receives, and thus its encoding precision, varies randomly across items and trials and on average decreases with set size. Resource might correspond to the gain of a neural population pattern of activity encoding a memorized feature. When gain is higher, a stimulus is encoded with higher precision (11,12). Variability in gain across items and trials is consistent with observations of single-neuron firing rate variability (13-15) and attentional fluctuations (16, 17).We tested the VP model against three alternative models (Fig. 1). According to the classic item-limit (IL) model (4), a fixed number of items is kept in memory, and memorized items are recalled perfectly. In the equal-precision (EP) model (6, 10), a continuous resource is evenly distributed across all items. The slots-plus-averaging (SA) model (9) acknowledges the presence of noise but combines it with the notion of ...

Three questions have been prominent in the study of visual working memory limitations: (a) What is the nature of mnemonic precision (e.g., quantized or continuous)? (b) How many items are remembered? (c) To what extent do spatial binding errors account for working memory failures? Modeling studies have typically focused on comparing possible answers to a single one of these questions, even though the result of such a comparison might depend on the assumed answers to both others. Here, we consider every possible combination of previously proposed answers to the individual questions. Each model is then a point in a 3-factor model space containing a total of 32 models, of which only 6 have been tested previously. We compare all models on data from 10 delayed-estimation experiments from 6 laboratories (for a total of 164 subjects and 131,452 trials). Consistently across experiments, we find that (a) mnemonic precision is not quantized but continuous and not equal but variable across items and trials; (b) the number of remembered items is likely to be variable across trials, with a mean of 6.4 in the best model (median across subjects); (c) spatial binding errors occur but explain only a small fraction of responses (16.5% at set size 8 in the best model). We find strong evidence against all 6 documented models. Our results demonstrate the value of factorial model comparison in working memory.

Decisions are accompanied by a degree of confidence that a selected option is correct. A sequential sampling framework explains the speed and accuracy of decisions and extends naturally to the confidence that the decision rendered is likely to be correct. However, discrepancies between confidence and accuracy suggest that confidence might be supported by mechanisms dissociated from the decision process. Here we show that this discrepancy can arise naturally because of simple processing delays. When participants were asked to report choice and confidence simultaneously, their confidence, reaction time and a perceptual decision about motion were explained by bounded evidence accumulation. However, we also observed revisions of the initial choice and/or confidence. These changes of mind were explained by a continuation of the mechanism that led to the initial choice. Our findings extend the sequential sampling framework to vacillation about confidence and invites caution in interpreting dissociations between confidence and accuracy.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.12192.001

Change detection is a classic paradigm that has been used for decades to argue that working memory can hold no more than a fixed number of items (“item-limit models”). Recent findings force us to consider the alternative view that working memory is limited by the precision in stimulus encoding, with mean precision decreasing with increasing set size (“continuous-resource models”). Most previous studies that used the change detection paradigm have ignored effects of limited encoding precision by using highly discriminable stimuli and only large changes. We conducted two change detection experiments (orientation and color) in which change magnitudes were drawn from a wide range, including small changes. In a rigorous comparison of five models, we found no evidence of an item limit. Instead, human change detection performance was best explained by a continuous-resource model in which encoding precision is variable across items and trials even at a given set size. This model accounts for comparison errors in a principled, probabilistic manner. Our findings sharply challenge the theoretical basis for most neural studies of working memory capacity.

A key function of the brain is to interpret noisy sensory information. To do so optimally, observers must, in many tasks, take into account knowledge of the precision with which stimuli are encoded. In an orientation change detection task, we find that encoding precision does not only depend on an experimentally controlled reliability parameter (shape), but also exhibits additional variability. In spite of variability in precision, human subjects seem to take into account precision near-optimally on a trial-to-trial and item-to-item basis. Our results offer a new conceptualization of the encoding of sensory information and highlight the brain’s remarkable ability to incorporate knowledge of uncertainty during complex perceptual decision-making.