Recent psychophysical experiments indicate that humans perform near-optimal Bayesian inference in a wide variety of tasks, ranging from cue integration to decision making to motor control. This implies that neurons both represent probability distributions and combine those distributions according to a close approximation to Bayes' rule. At first sight, it would seem that the high variability in the responses of cortical neurons would make it difficult to implement such optimal statistical inference in cortical circuits. We argue that, in fact, this variability implies that populations of neurons automatically represent probability distributions over the stimulus, a type of code we call probabilistic population codes. Moreover, we demonstrate that the Poisson-like variability observed in cortex reduces a broad class of Bayesian inference to simple linear combinations of populations of neural activity. These results hold for arbitrary probability distributions over the stimulus, for tuning curves of arbitrary shape and for realistic neuronal variability.

Perceptual events derive their significance to an animal from their meaning about the world, that is from the information they carry about their causes. The brain should thus be able to efficiently infer the causes underlying our sensory events. Here we use multisensory cue combination to study causal inference in perception. We formulate an ideal-observer model that infers whether two sensory cues originate from the same location and that also estimates their location(s). This model accurately predicts the nonlinear integration of cues by human subjects in two auditory-visual localization tasks. The results show that indeed humans can efficiently infer the causal structure as well as the location of causes. By combining insights from the study of causal inference with the ideal-observer approach to sensory cue combination, we show that the capacity to infer causal structure is not limited to conscious, high-level cognition; it is also performed continually and effortlessly in perception.

Previous studies have suggested that visual short-term memory (VSTM) has a storage limit of approximately four items. However, the type of high-threshold (HT) model used to derive this estimate is based on a number of assumptions that have been criticized in other experimental paradigms (e.g., visual search). Here we report findings from nine experiments in which VSTM for color, spatial frequency, and orientation was modeled using a signal detection theory (SDT) approach. In Experiments 1-6, two arrays composed of multiple stimulus elements were presented for 100 ms with a 1500 ms ISI. Observers were asked to report in a yes/no fashion whether there was any difference between the first and second arrays, and to rate their confidence in their response on a 1-4 scale. In Experiments 1-3, only one stimulus element difference could occur (T = 1) while set size was varied. In Experiments 4-6, set size was fixed while the number of stimuli that might change was varied (T = 1, 2, 3, and 4). Three general models were tested against the receiver operating characteristics generated by the six experiments. In addition to the HT model, two SDT models were tried: one assuming summation of signals prior to a decision, the other using a max rule. In Experiments 7-9, observers were asked to directly report the relevant feature attribute of a stimulus presented 1500 ms previously, from an array of varying set size. Overall, the results suggest that observers encode stimuli independently and in parallel, and that performance is limited by internal noise, which is a function of set size.

It is commonly believed that visual short-term memory (VSTM) consists of a fixed number of "slots" in which items can be stored. An alternative theory in which memory resource is a continuous quantity distributed over all items seems to be refuted by the appearance of guessing in human responses. Here, we introduce a model in which resource is not only continuous but also variable across items and trials, causing random fluctuations in encoding precision. We tested this model against previous models using two VSTM paradigms and two feature dimensions. Our model accurately accounts for all aspects of the data, including apparent guessing, and outperforms slot models in formal model comparison. At the neural level, variability in precision might correspond to variability in neural population gain and doubly stochastic stimulus representation. Our results suggest that VSTM resource is continuous and variable rather than discrete and fixed and might explain why subjective experience of VSTM is not all or none.T homas Chamberlin famously warned scientists against entertaining only a single hypothesis, for such a modus operandi might lead to undue attachment and "a pressing of the facts to make them fit the theory" (ref. 1, p. 840). For half a century, the study of short-term memory limitations has been dominated by a single hypothesis, namely that a fixed number of items can be held in memory and any excess items are discarded (2-5). The alternative notion that short-term memory resource is a continuous quantity distributed over all items, with a lower amount per item translating into lower encoding precision, has enjoyed some success (6-8), but has been unable to account for the finding that humans often seem to make a random guess when asked to report the identity of one of a set of remembered items, especially when many items are present (9). Specifically, if resource were evenly distributed across items (6, 10), observers would never guess. Thus, at present, no viable continuous-resource model exists.Here, we propose a more sophisticated continuous-resource model, the variable-precision (VP) model, in which the amount of resource an item receives, and thus its encoding precision, varies randomly across items and trials and on average decreases with set size. Resource might correspond to the gain of a neural population pattern of activity encoding a memorized feature. When gain is higher, a stimulus is encoded with higher precision (11,12). Variability in gain across items and trials is consistent with observations of single-neuron firing rate variability (13-15) and attentional fluctuations (16, 17).We tested the VP model against three alternative models (Fig. 1). According to the classic item-limit (IL) model (4), a fixed number of items is kept in memory, and memorized items are recalled perfectly. In the equal-precision (EP) model (6, 10), a continuous resource is evenly distributed across all items. The slots-plus-averaging (SA) model (9) acknowledges the presence of noise but combines it with the notion of ...

There is strong behavioral and physiological evidence that the brain both represents probability distributions and performs probabilistic inference. Computational neuroscientists have started to shed light on how these probabilistic representations and computations might be implemented in neural circuits. One particularly appealing aspect of these theories is their generality: they can be used to model a wide range of tasks, from sensory processing to high-level cognition. To date, however, these theories have only been applied to very simple tasks. Here we discuss the challenges that will emerge as researchers start focusing their efforts on real-life computations, with a focus on probabilistic learning, structural learning and approximate inference.