BackgroundVaccine hesitancy presents an obstacle to the campaign to control COVID-19. It has previously been found to be associated with youth, female gender, low income, low education, low medical trust, minority ethnic group membership, low perceived risk from COVID-19, use of certain social media platforms, and conspiracy beliefs. However, it is unclear which of these predictors might explain variance associated with others. MethodsAn online survey was conducted with a representative sample of 4343 UK residents, aged 18 to 75, between 21 Nov and 21 Dec 2020. Predictors of vaccine hesitancy were assessed using linear rank-order models. ResultsCoronavirus vaccine hesitancy is associated with youth, female gender, low income, low education, high informational reliance on social media, low informational reliance on print and broadcast media, membership of other than white ethnic groups, low perceived risk from COVID-19, and low trust in scientists and medics, as well as (to a much lesser extent) low trust in government. Coronavirus conspiracy suspicions and general vaccine attitudes appear uniquely predictive, jointly explaining 35% of variance. Following controls for these variables, effects associated with trust, ethnicity, and social media reliance largely or completely disappear, while the effect associated with education is reversed. ConclusionsStrengthening positive attitudes to vaccination and reducing conspiracy suspicions with regard to the coronavirus may have a positive effect on vaccine uptake, especially among ethnic groups with heightened vaccine hesitancy. However, vaccine hesitancy associated with age and gender does not appear to be explained by other predictor variables tested here. This is an Accepted Manuscript for Psychological Medicine as part of the Cambridge Coronavirus Collection. Subject to change during the editing and production process.

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Immigrant integration appears to be generational in the USA, and further facilitated by religious involvement. We examine whether similar patterns exist in Britain. We find evidence for secularization across ethnic minority groups, measured by private religious practice and religious salience. Communal religious practice appears robust to generational decline. Ethnic minority members of the second generation exhibit lower social trust; for the 1.5 generation, being more religious is associated with lower trust. However, members of the 1.5 and second generation are more civically involved than the first and religiosity further increases civic involvement. While anecdotal accounts suggest that religiosity has a particularly dissociative effect on the second generation, we find no evidence for this. In sum, successive generations of ethnic minority respondents appear to be secularizing; successive generations are more civically involved than the arriving generation, although less trusting; and immigrant religiosity promotes civic integration.