This article reviews results of a study conducted by the Technische Universität München into why the majority of German multinationals covered by the European Works Council (EWC) Directive (1994) continue not to take advantage of this legal provision. After providing a brief outline of the project's research design, the main part of the article considers reasons why employee representatives fail to set up an EWC. As will be shown, these reasons mainly concern (i) a knowledge deficit about the EWC Directive; (ii) a lack of transparency regarding company structure; and (iii) the perceived limited value of an EWC on the part of German works councillors.

This article examines the problem of setting up European Works Councils in German multinationals. Based on the findings of a Hans-Böckler-Stiftung funded project, the article argues that a key problem is the legal status of many German companies covered by the European Works Councils Directive: specifically, that companies in private hands are not legally required to reveal the number of their employees and their company structure. This lack of transparency makes it very difficult for employee representatives to determine whether their undertaking is covered by the Directive. The article also considers some issues brought to light by a German EWC database recently compiled at the Technische Universität München to support the university's research into the non-compliance with the European Works Council Directive by German multinationals. ❖❖❖ Sommaire Cet article aborde la question de la mise en place de comités d'entreprise européens dans les multinationales allemandes. Basé sur les résultats d'un projet financé par la fondation Hans-Böckler, l'article constate qu'un problème-clé est le statut juridique de bon nombre d'entreprises allemandes couvertes par la directive sur les comités d'entreprise européens et plus particulièrement que des entreprises privées ne sont pas légalement contraintes de révéler leur nombre d'effectifs ni leur structure d'entreprise. Cette absence de transparence complique beaucoup la tâche des représentants des travailleurs de déterminer si leur entreprise est couverte ou non par la directive. L'article examine également quelques-uns des problèmes mis en lumière par une base de données allemande sur les comités d'entreprise européens récemment compilée par l'université technique de Munich pour soutenir la recherche de cette université sur la non-conformité de multinationales allemandes avec la directive sur les comités d'entreprise européens. Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Probleme, die sich bei der Einrichtung europäischer Betriebsräte (EBR) in deutschen multinationalen Unternehmen stellen. Er basiert auf den Ergebnissen eines Projektes, das von der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung gefördert wurde. Die Autoren argumentieren, dass eines der Schlüsselprobleme in der Rechtsstellung vieler unter die EBR-Richtlinie fallender deutscher Unternehmen besteht, und insbesondere in der Tatsache, dass privatwirtschaftliche Unternehmen nicht gesetzlich verpflichtet sind, die Zahl ihrer Angestellten und ihre Gesellschaftsstruktur offenzulegen. Aufgrund dieser mangelnden Transparenz ist es für Arbeitnehmervertreter sehr schwierig festzustellen, ob ihr Unternehmen in den Geltungsbereich der Richtlinie fällt. Ferner befasst sich der Beitrag mit einer Reihe von Aspekten, die sich aus einer deutschen EBR-Datenbank ableiten lassen. Diese Datenbank wurde kürzlich von der Technischen Universität München geschaffen, um Forschungsarbeiten zu Verstößen deutscher multinationaler Unternehmen gegen die EBR-Richtlinie zu unterstützen.

No abstract

In a society where knowledge has become the main factor of production, intellectual property rights are an important issue in social conflicts. However, in the current debate about the reform of intellectual property (IP) law, the trade unions are playing hardly any role, although the new regulations have an impact on employed and self-employed workers as well as on the power relationship of labor and capital. This article is intended to provide a theoretical discussion of IP law issues in the context of labor market changes. Using the example of software production, the article raises two questions: What kinds of strategies does management apply to control and exploit knowledge workers? How do software patents and free software practices affect their workplace rights? The article deals with these issues on the European Union (EU) and the national level by focusing on the role and behavior of German and Austrian unions. Although these unions have become increasingly aware of the impact of IP law, they are struggling to find a common position that is fitted to defend the rights of their highly skilled (potential) members. We conclude that unions should refrain from a blind adherence to strong intellectual property rights. They should rather contribute to the creation of a new balance between free access to knowledge and culture and the protection of the individual rights of workers.

Knowledge workers are often considered to prefer an individual rather than a collective articulation of their interests. This phenomenon is primarily explained by their individualistic orientation and power derived from possessing scarce knowledge. However, highly skilled work is a very heterogeneous field. In order to understand the diverse experiences of highly skilled employees and their attitudes towards collective action, this article proposes a model based on the juxtaposition of professional and knowledge work that entails three distinct logics of control over knowledge: professionalism, market closure and bureaucracy. The forms of collective action (i.e. intra-group solidarity, inter-group solidarity, no solidarity) are predicted to vary contingent on the prevailing position within a field. The model is illustrated by the example of university and non-university research in Austria. Professional self-control of scientific knowledge has been partly replaced by bureaucratic control of top management. This, in turn, mitigates power derived from professional knowledge. Unlike trade unions, collective action based on inter-group solidarity has been found to become more attractive. In non-university research organizations, the prevailing market logic entails employees using expertise or innovation to close a market and, hence, to refrain from acting collectively.